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Preface  
 
A postgraduate seminar series with a title Cyber Warfare held at the Department 
of Military Technology of the National Defence University in the fall of 2012. 
This book is a collection of some of talks that were presented in the seminar. The 
papers address computer network defence in military cognitive networks, 
computer network exploitation, non-state actors in cyberspace operations, 
offensive cyber-capabilities against critical infrastructure and adapting the 
current national defence doctrine to cyber domain. This set of papers tries to give 
some insight to current issues of the cyber warfare. 
 
The seminar has always made a publication of the papers but this has been an 
internal publication of the Finnish Defence Forces and has not hindered 
publication of the papers in international conferences. Publication of these papers 
in peer reviewed conferences has indeed been always the goal of the seminar, 
since it teaches writing conference level papers. We still hope that an internal 
publication in the department series is useful to the Finnish Defence Forces by 
offering an easy access to these papers. 
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Computer Network Defence  
in Military Cognitive Networks 
 
Anssi Kärkkäinen 
Defence Command Finland 
anssi.karkkainen@mil.fi 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
For complex computer networks, the task of configuring the ideal network oper-
ating parameters is challenging. In near future, Cognitive Network (CN) is seen 
as an answer to improve the performance of these networks. CN is defined as a 
network with a cognitive process that can understands current conditions, plan, 
decide, act on those conditions, and learn from the results of actions. A key factor 
in the process of learning is the ability to take advantage of the previous deci-
sions. Cognitive network is seen to have significant benefits in military networks. 
At the same time, cyber threats have grown tremendously and become a global 
threat as a result of networked infrastructures. Various technologies and technical 
solutions are developed to guarantee cyber security on communications networks 
and the Internet. Traditionally, the Computer Network Defence (CND) capability 
is mainly based on an individual (technical) security controls with static configu-
rations. At worst, the security controls have been implemented afterwards. Previ-
ously, information systems and networks are not typically built in cyber security 
terms. 
 
This paper presents a new approach to build the CND capabilities from a cogni-
tive process point of view. For this cognitive process, situation awareness (SA) 
and management is a critical capability. The paper proposes a model to build 
network security services and capabilities using a dynamic and adaptive ap-
proach. Security controls are established and modified according to decisions 
made by a cognitive process. The model consists of two important elements; SA 
establishment and management, and network security control. The SA element 
provides awareness of the system and environment state, and the control part 
modifies updates and configures network settings and parameters. The security 
control element adjusts configurable security controls in a cognitive network 
node. The model proposes active defence capabilities which enable a cognitive 
service and capability allocation in which the system configuration varies ran-
domly resulting in a non-static target for an attacker. The paper also discusses 
evaluation and implementation challenges of the model. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Networks and information services play as a major role on the future battlefield. 
Information sharing and networked systems bring advantages to modern war 
fighters. Increasing amount of information and its accuracy helps decision-
makers to make faster and more precise decisions. Future communication and 
network technologies will provide more capacity and security to support the mo-
bile and agile operations. The technologies do not solve all the challenges of 
network centric operations challenges but it brings more opportunities to infor-
mation sharing and processing. 
 
One of the critical requirements for the military networks is cyber security. In-
formation security means that information could not be stolen or modified, net-
works function as desired, and information availability is guaranteed. Informa-
tion security sets controls to protect information in the systems but cyber security 
includes all the aspects how an adversary could use information networks to 
cause desired effects in a target systems. This means that information is not an 
only protected object. Through cyber security the information system should be 
protected against all imaginable attacks so that the system is able to provide ser-
vices continuously. 
 
Expansion of cyberspace has created new and increasing threats to military 
communications. Cyberspace can be seen as an electronic medium of computer 
networks in which online communication and information sharing takes place. 
Thus all military equipment with a programmable micro circuit or computer cre-
ates a new attack surface to be exploited by an adversary. The purpose of a cyber 
attack may be e.g. information espionage and sabotage or physical damage. In-
formation espionage is the act of obtaining sensitive, proprietary or classified in-
formation. Physical damage is a result of cyberspace attack in which the target is 
to affect SCADA systems so that the control of industrial or infrastructure proc-
esses is disturbed. 
 
From military perspective, information and network protection could be seen as 
military operations. Computer Network Operations (CNO) is a broad term to de-
scribe the operations used primarily to disrupt, disable, degrade or deceive an ad-
versary’s command and control, thus disabling the adversary’s ability to make 
effective and timely decisions, while protecting and preserving friendly com-
mand and control. Computer Network Defence (CND) is a defensive part of 
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CNO. CND consists of actions in cyberspace to monitor, detect, analyse response 
and protect hostile activity. 
 
Cognitive Network (CN) is a new research field that is seen as an answer to also 
the performance of the military networks. CN provides learning and adaptation 
features which will be key functionalities for a future complex and massive in-
formation and networking system because the task of configuring the network 
operating parameters is challenging in complex computer networks. CN is de-
fined as a network with a cognitive process that can understands current condi-
tions, plan, decide, act on those conditions, and learn from the results of actions. 
A key factor in the process of learning is the ability to take advantage of the pre-
vious decisions. Cognitive networks is seen a promising solution to improve 
military communications and networking. At least in theory, the cognitive net-
works provide: 
 
 improved robustness and adaptability 
 improved usability and comprehensibility,  
 improved security and stability, and 
 reduced human intervention for operation and configuration.[1] 
 
Growing cyber threat requires new type of approach when implementing military 
and commercial information and communication systems. This study presents 
this new approach to build CND capabilities into cognitive military networks. 
The paper proposes an architectural model to implement network services and 
capabilities using a dynamic and adaptive method. A cognitive process is used to 
establish and modify user and network services, and also security services or 
controls. The proposed model consists of two main elements; SA establishment 
and management, and network control. Situation Awareness (SA) is a critical 
functionality for CN to provide understanding surrounding environment and sys-
tem internal state. The network control manages an adjustable network platform 
which adapts network parameters according to the made decisions. 
 
The content of the paper is following. Section 2 discusses on major elements and 
requirements of building CND. Section 3 gives an overview of cognitive net-
works and cyber threat on them. Section 4 proposes a new model for cognitive 
CND, and in section 5, the model is evaluated and some implementation chal-
lenges are presented. Section 6 concludes this paper. 
 
 
2. Computer Network Defence 
 
Computer Network Defence (CND) is about how to secure information and data 
from hostile attacks. CND could be applied into both military and civilian envi-
ronments, but the term Computer Network Defence is typically used within mili-
tary operations. CND illustrates defensive aspects of Computer Network Opera-
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tions (CNO). CNO also includes Computer Network Attack (CNA) and Com-
puter Network Exploitation (CNE). CNA includes all the actions taken through 
the use of computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information 
resident in computers and networks. CNE uses computer networks to gather data 
from target or adversary automated information systems or networks for intelli-
gence and operations. [2] 
 
2.1 Definition of computer network defence 
 
The term Computer Network Defence (CND) was created to describe defensive 
operations on networks. According to DoD [3] Computer Network Defence in-
cludes all the actions taken through the use of computer networks to protect, 
monitor, analyse, detect and respond to unauthorized activity within Department 
of Defence information systems and computer networks. Naturally, this defini-
tion talks about the DoD’s systems and networks. Removing the DoD aspect the 
definition of CND can be stated as:  
 
Computer Network Defence includes actions taken via computer networks to pro-
tect, monitor, analyse, detect and respond to network attacks, intrusions, disrup-
tions or other unauthorized actions that would compromise or cripple defence 
information systems and networks. [4] 
 
As the definition shows the general idea is to protect the information systems 
against unauthorized use. The definition does not seem to bring up any new as-
pects if the definition is compared to traditional information and network secu-
rity. The CND definition has more operational view to securing information and 
may also include some active measures as counterattacks and pre-emptive attacks 
[2]. 
 
Once we consider network defence, we often see the term of Information Assur-
ance (IA). Information Assurance is tightly related to information security but IA 
consists more of the strategic risk assessment and management of information 
systems rather than the implementation of security controls. In addition to de-
fending against malicious code and network attacks, IA planners consider corpo-
rate governance issues such as privacy, regulatory and standards compliance, au-
diting, business continuity, and disaster recovery as they relate to information 
systems. IA integrates an organized, manned, equipped and trained workforce to 
guard, secure and secure information and information systems by providing the 
security services/attributes of availability, authentication, confidentiality, integ-
rity and non-repudiation. [5] 
 
IA is also an interdisciplinary field requiring expertise in accounting, fraud ex-
amination, forensic science, management science, systems engineering, security 
engineering, and criminology, in addition to computer science. Thus IA is best 
thought to be as an umbrella term for information security and in that way also 
for CND in a broader context. 
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Figure 1. The definitions and their relationships 
 
Figure 1 illustrates relationships between cyber defence, CND, and IA. Cyber de-
fence is thought to be a high-level term for all protective means for information 
systems and networks. It includes both CND and IA. CND is part of Computer 
Network Operations but at the same time it is an element of IA. Information As-
surance also includes risk management, business recovery and continuity, and 
compliance. 
 
2.2 Passive and active defence 
 
Although the purpose of CND is to protect information services and infrastruc-
ture, CND also includes some CNA and CNE capabilities because defence re-
quires both passive and active methods. For example through CNE operations the 
defender receives intelligence information that could be used for counteractions 
during the attacks or even before them. As in traditional war fighting and thus 
pass includes could be approached with passive or active security implementa-
tion. 
 
The passive controls typically consist of firewalls, antivirus applications, access 
control and vulnerability patching [6]. The primary objective of firewalls is to 
control the incoming and outgoing network traffic by examining the data packets 
and determining whether it should be allowed through or not, based on a precon-
figured rule set. A major challenge is to keep the rule set updated. An effective 
firewall also requires updates to ensure it can recognize and exclude newly dis-
covered threats. Thus, a firewall is only as good as the system administrator who 
runs it. First-generation firewalls were basically packet filters, and nowadays 
third-generation firewalls proceed application filtering as they monitor certain 
applications and protocols. 
 
Antivirus applications are used to prevent, detect and remove malicious code and 
malware. A typical antivirus application is based on a signature detection in 
which known patterns of data within executable code are searched. Signature li-
braries are updated according to new viruses. A problem is that a virus must be 
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found before a specific signature is developed. Thus, heuristic approaches can be 
used to counter such so-called zero-day threats.  
 
Access control provides a capability to prevent unauthorized party to access pri-
vate information. Access control systems provide the essential services of identi-
fication and authentication, authorization, and auditing which in chronology or-
der provide the chain of access control (see Figure 2). [2] 
 
The authentication process is for verifying the identity of an individual or system 
against a presented set of credentials. This is typically delivered using user-
name/password combination, RSA SecureID, or PKI-cards. In the future these 
might include biometric identifiers, such as fingerprints, iris scans, or other 
means based on physical attributes. The authorization process open Activities 
that particular identity is allowed to carry out, known as authorization. A simple 
design principle is that only the minimum level of privilege that is needed for it 
to operate properly is given for each user. The auditing process has a capability 
to monitor what activities have taken place on an information system. [2] 
     
 
 
Figure 2. The access control chain 
 
Patching is a common process to fix problems with, or update a computer pro-
gram its supporting data. Patching is mainly conducted to fix critical or other se-
curity vulnerabilities, but it also includes fixing other bugs and improving the 
system usability or performance. Poorly designed and implemented patches can 
sometimes cause new unknown problems. 
 
IDS (Intrusion Detection System) is a device or software application which 
monitors network traffic or system functionality for malicious behaviour. IPS 
(Intrusion Prevention System) is an extension of IDS providing ability to actively 
prevent or block intrusions that are detected. Intrusion detection and prevention 
systems are mainly designed for identifying possible incidents, logging informa-
tion about them, and reporting attempts. [7] 
 
Active defence can be divided into three categories according to the type of ac-
tivity. These are pre-emptive attacks, counterattacks, and active deception. [6] 
Pre-emptive attacks may have only little effects to an adversary‘s CNA capabili-
ties, if these remain isolated from the Internet until actually beginning their at-
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tack. A challenge is to discover possible attack sources and know that that adver-
sary is going to use the source against friendly systems. The purpose of the pre-
emptive attacks is to affect the adversary before attacks are launched. 
 
Counterattacks are more promising, but these attacks must begin early enough to 
authorize all preparatory activities to be completed before the adversary‘s CNA 
is completed. Active deception also shows promise, but only when attacks can be 
perceived quickly and accurately, and adversaries’ attacks could be redirected 
into dummy or fake networks and services (honey nets). Active deception tries to 
channel an attack away from the defender‘s information system and into dummy 
networks. The defender leads the attackers to believe the attacks are successful, 
when in fact the attacks are neutralized. Active and passive defence measures can 
work side by side to strengthen one another. 
 
2.3 Security measures 
 
The purpose of cyber security and defence is to protect information in all forms. 
In a military context, information exposition may have greater consequences than 
information of other (e.g. civilian) areas. In a military environment, lives can be 
lost on a large scale or the balance of power can be shifted significantly. Pro-
tected information incudes e.g. operations orders, war plans, troop movements, 
technical specifications for weapons or intelligence collection systems, identities 
of undercover intelligence agents, and any number of other items critical to the 
functioning of military and government. 
 
There are several measures that are used when information is being protected. 
Commonly known measures are confidentiality, integrity and availability. How-
ever, in [8] four other measures are presented. These seven measures are listed in 
Table 1. The ITU-T X.805 [9] standard describes eight security dimensions that 
include some of those presented in Table 1, but the standard also introduces a 
few new dimensions. The ITU-T dimensions are access control, authentication, 
non-repudiation, data confidentiality, communication security, data integrity, 
availability, and privacy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 8 
Table 1. The security measures and their purpose  
 
 
 
 
2.4 Cyber Situational Awareness 
 
Cyber Situational Awareness (SA) is very critical for all kinds of defensive ac-
tions including CND. As in traditional warfare, also CND requires high quality 
security awareness. Situational awareness is established in human brains, which 
means that SA technology attempts to provide understandable information of an 
operating environment. When we consider cyber SA of the CND assets, we face 
with at least seven aspects [10]: 
 
1. Awareness of the current situation 
2. Awareness of the attack impact  
3. Awareness of how situations develop 
4. Awareness of adversary behaviour 
5. Awareness of why and how the current situation is caused. This aspect in-
cludes causality analysis (back-tracking) and forensics 
6. Awareness of the quality (and trustworthiness) of the collected situation 
awareness information items 
7. Evaluation of possible futures of the current situation. 
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Cyber security situation awareness can be regarded as a three phase process [11] 
in which the previous aspects are included. The phases are situation recognition 
(observations), situation comprehension (understanding) and situation projection 
(prediction). Smart CND solutions require technologies to support these process 
phases when a goal is to produce automated cyber defence systems. However, in 
practice, current cyber SA with hardware sensors and advanced computer pro-
grams do not operate without mental processes of human beings making ad-
vanced decisions [11]. 
 
2.5 Defence in depth 
 
Defence in depth is an old military concept which describes a layered approach 
to defence [2]. In cyber security context, defence in depth means security con-
trols and solutions are layered so that an attacker must penetrate several layer to 
reach target data or location. An example of the layered defence is shown in Fig-
ure 3.  In this example case there are defences at the network level, the host level, 
the application level, and the data level. Critical information is located at the cen-
ter of all these layers of defence. Security measures and controls at each layer 
may be different according to the environment in question, but the basic princi-
ples will remain the same. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. An example of layered defences 
 
Layered defences should be configured so that it slows an attacker as much as the 
defender has time to detect and defend successfully the attacks. It is very unreal-
istic to expect that we can build an impenetrable system which is secure forever. 
By using segmentation and access restrictions, we can mitigate some of the risks 
of an adversary being able to penetrate, steal information and get back out. Fig-
ure 3 also shows some examples of security controls and mechanisms related to 
each defence layers. At the data layer, cryptography is an important method. The 
application layer includes access control mechanisms to prevent unauthorized 
accesses. The methods at the host and network layers consist of firewalls, 
IDS/IPSs, access controls and AMSs (Application Management Services). 
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3. Cognitive Networks 
 
In [12] and [13] Cognitive Networks (CN) are described as: 
  
”A cognitive network is a network with a cognitive process that can 
perceive current network conditions, and then plan, decide, and act on 
those conditions. The network can learn from these adaptations and use 
them to make future decisions, all while taking into account end-to-end 
goals.” 
 
The cognitive aspect of this description is similar to those used to describe a cog-
nitive radio and broadly includes many simple models of cognition and learning. 
Unlike cognitive radios, cognitive network do not restrict its scope in radio spec-
trum. CN tries to exactly perceive the current network situation and plan and de-
cide to meet the end-to-end goals in an entire network aspect. CN learns through 
this adaptation and uses information of these previous actions in future decisions. 
As new aspects, the definition introduces the terms network and end-to-end goal. 
Without the network and end-to-end approach, the system may only perform as a 
cognitive device or network layer, but not as a cognitive network in a wide scale. 
 
In the definition end-to-end represents all the network elements involved in the 
transmission of a data flow. In military communications, this includes e.g. the 
tactical radios, radio relays, routers, switches, virtual connections, encryption de-
vices, interfaces, or SDR waveforms. The end-to-end goal which is typically de-
fined by a client-server type of service, gives a cognitive network its network-
wide scope. This separates the scheme from other adaptation approaches, which 
usually have a scope of single element, layer or resource. 
 
3.1 Cognitive process and system framework 
 
A cognitive process in such networks could be viewed as the commonly known 
OODA loop [14] in which the network observes, orients, decides and acts. Figure 
4 shows the phases of the OODA loop in context of cognitive networking. The 
observation phase is critical because the effect of a cognitive network’s decisions 
on the network performance depends on how much network state information is 
available. If a cognitive network has knowledge of the entire network’s state, 
cognitive decisions should be more “correct” than those made in ignorance. For a 
large, complicated system such as military tactical networks, it is unlikely that 
the cognitive network would know the total system state. It could be very high 
costly to communicate status information beyond those network elements requir-
ing it, meaning CN will have to work with less than a complete picture of the 
network resource status. 
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Figure 4. The “OODA” loop in context of cognitive networking 
 
The orientation phase also plays an important role in the cognitive process. In 
this phase all observed information and previous knowledge are add together and 
analysed.  Filters and weighting are examples of methods used in the orientation 
phase. In the decision phase the best decision for the required end-to-end data 
flow capability is made. Finally, actions are taken in the Acting phase. Action 
includes modifications of cognitive network elements. These elements associated 
with each data flow are allowed to act selfishly and independently (in the context 
of the entire network) to achieve local goals. The actions taken have straight ef-
fect to the observed environment or network state, thus a feedback loop is created 
in which past interactions with the environment guide current and future interac-
tions. 
 
Figure 5 illustrates a cognitive system framework [12] which consists of three 
functional levels. The end-to-end level includes applications, users and resources 
which form the end-to-end goals to be achieved at an appropriate service level. 
The cognitive level consists of three components: the specification language, 
cognition layer, and network status sensors. These components provide the actual 
intelligence of the cognitive level, and allow the level to interface with the con-
figurable network elements and the users and applications on the end-to-end lev-
el. 
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Figure 5. A cognitive system framework 
 
For connecting the top level requirements to the cognitive level, an interface lay-
er must exist. Information about the goal must not be globally known but needs 
to be communicated between the source of the requirements and the local cogni-
tive process. Other requirements for the specification language include at least 
support for distributed or centralized operation including the sharing of data be-
tween multiple cognition layers. The specification language does not actually 
perform the cognitive process which is done by the cognition layer, but the lan-
guage is required to translate application level requirements for the cognitive lay-
er. 
 
The cognitive process of the network can be either centralized or distributed. In 
the military environment, the requirements for high-resilience mean that each 
node should be able to maintain a cognitive process, providing an argument 
against the centralized solution. The cognition layer contains the cognitive ele-
ment of the framework. Typically, cognition is provided through various ma-
chine learning algorithms as neural networks, genetic algorithms, artificial intel-
ligence, Kalman filters and learning automata algorithms [12]. The network sta-
tus sensors provide feedback from the network to the cognition layer, and the 
sensors also allow the cognition layer to observe patterns, trends, and thresholds 
in the network for possible action. To be able to report connection status sensors 
must have ability manage the sensor. The sensor layer is also capable to distrib-
ute their information to the entire network. 
 
The software adaptive network layer consists of the network application pro-
gramming interface (API) and configurable network elements. The network API 
provides a generic interface to adjust network parameters according to actions 
decided by the cognitive layer. Another responsibility of the API is to notify the 
cognitive network of what the operating states of the network elements are. Many 
modifications to the network stack require that all the links and nodes are syn-
chronized and operating in the same mode. The communication required to syn-
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chronize these states is the responsibility of the software adaptive platform and 
could be realized either in or out of channel. 
 
3.2 Cyber threats on cognitive networks 
 
Security of CN is discussed in [15], [16], [17], [18}] and [19]. Although, the 
most of the traditional cyber threats (e.g. TCP/IP threats, man-in-the-middle, etc.) 
are valid, cognitive networks also face some unique security challenges not faced 
by conventional wireless or wired networks. In an ideal CN, security of the net-
work is provided as a result of a cognitive process, which generates new threats. 
For instance, incomplete situation awareness or a disturbed decision-making pro-
cess may lead to the decision not to use any security controls for certain commu-
nications although it is extremely required. Table 2 presents three new cyber se-
curity threats related to cognitive networking. 
 
Table 2. Major security threats in cognitive networks 
 
 
  
In the cognitive network, locally-collected and exchanged information is used to 
construct a perceived information environment that will influence both current 
and future behaviours. By violating sensor data, information sharing and history 
data (databases), an attacker is able to change the information environment. 
Training with the incorrectly perceived environment will cause the CN to adapt 
incorrectly, which affects short-term behaviour. Unfortunately, the CN uses these 
adaptation experiences as a basis for new decisions. Thus, if the malicious attack 
perpetrator is clever enough to disguise their actions from detection, they have 
the opportunity for long-term impact on behaviour. Furthermore, the CN collabo-
rates with its fellow nodes to determine behaviour. Consequently, this provides 
an opportunity to propagate a behaviour through the network in much the same 
way that a malicious worm. 
 
In cognitive networks, one of the main concerns is an attacker spoofing faulty 
sensor information, causing a network node to select an undesired configuration. 
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By manipulating the receiving information the attacker can cause faulty statistics 
data to be appeared in the knowledge database of a network node. 
 
The cyber threat on CN can also be considered by analysing the objectives of a 
cyber attack and the ultimate outcome the attack may have. The effects of cyber 
attack align generally into four areas [19]: 
 Loss of Integrity. Data integrity is a basic security requirement for end us-
ers, but it is also very critical for CN behaviour. If the loss of data integ-
rity is not corrected, continued use of the corrupted data could result in in-
accuracy, fraud, or incorrect decisions in a cognitive process. 
 Loss of Availability. If a mission-critical network is attacked and all ser-
vices are made unavailable to its end users, the mission or operation will 
most likely be affected. Loss of system functionality and operational ef-
fectiveness may result in loss of productive time, or military decision-
making. In CNs, loss of availability also means that information and ser-
vices are not available for the cognitive process. 
 Loss of Confidentiality. Successful military operations require high infor-
mation confidentiality. CN should provide appropriate confidentiality ser-
vices so that operational data is kept secret as desired. Communication 
channels, data processes and databases must be secured against untrusted 
parties. Confidentiality is also critical to the cognitive process because sto-
len information could be used against the process. 
 Physical Destruction. Physical destruction is possible through cognitive 
networking when the CN provides a platform for supervisory control and 
data acquisition (SCADA) systems. 
 
 
4. Cognitive Computer Network Defence Model 
 
Cognitive networks provide new opportunities to design and build security fea-
tures and functions into the networking system. Learning and decision-making 
capabilities are key factors to create automated, resource-efficient and, especially 
in a military context, secure communications networks and services. In next sec-
tion, a new architectural model for cognitive computer network defence is pre-
sented. The model describes high-level elements of the cognitive CND system. 
 
4.1 Model overview 
 
The overview of the cognitive CND model is depicted in Figure 6. The figure 
shows the main elements of the model which are security situational awareness 
(SA), decision-making, and security control management, and active defence. 
The decision-making element is a core of the cognitive system. The decision-
making gets inputs from the SA element, and the history database, and based on 
the desired (security) goal performs a computational process that ends up with a 
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decision. The end-to-end security goal is defined by a network user or service 
(application). 
 
The task of the SA element is to provide high-quality situational understanding. 
The element receives sensor data from each system layer. In this model, the cog-
nitive network is divided into four functional layers that are Network, Host, Ap-
plication and Data. The security control management element configures and up-
dates security controls at each layer. These controls include a large variety of tra-
ditional, and in the future, new security mechanisms. The security control man-
agement element transforms incoming decisions into updated security parameter 
values, and configures those values into the system. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Overview of the model 
 
The purpose of the active defence element is to execute active defence operations 
as part of cognitive CND. In this model, active defence means both counterac-
tions against an adversary, and active service configuring in the cognitive nodes. 
The counteractions can be pre-emptive or reactive as described in Section 2.2. 
The purpose is to eliminate attack sources beforehand or during attacks. Active 
service configuring could be seen as part of deception operations. The idea is to 
actively change service configuration, and thus make an attacker’s destination 
system as a moving target. This means that the target configuration is already 
changed during attack preparations (after intelligence data collection). Configure 
changes might include e.g. application versions, operating system (OS) types, 
port configurations, process access structures, etc. 
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Distributed Security Information Repository consists of different databases that 
are distributed among the network nodes. The databases include history data (e.g. 
previous decisions and conditions), vulnerability and threat libraries, and current 
security parameters of the other nodes. 
 
4.2 Situation Awareness 
 
Situation Awareness (SA) is a very critical part of the cognitive process and net-
work. The quality of decisions depends on the level of SA. The SA element con-
sists of four main elements; sensors data collection, threat management, vulner-
ability management and SA engine. Figure 7 illustrates the SA element of the 
model. 
 
 
 
Figure 7. The SA element 
 
The purpose of sensor data collection is to collect all SA related information for 
data analysis and fusion. The sensor data sources include both internal and exter-
nal sensors. The node internal state sensors collect security and service perform-
ance data about the internal state of each network node. At the network layer, 
collected internal parameter data includes cryptography algorithms and key 
lengths, IDS/IPS rules and policies, anomalous traffic alerts, incidents DMZ con-
figurations, allocated links, etc. At the host layer, internal parameter data consists 
of access control lists (valid users and services), tunnelling parameters, authenti-
cation information, access blockages etc. At the application layer, collected data 
concerns end-to-end encryption settings, application security configurations, au-
thorized code lists, etc. 
 
The external sensors monitor environmental conditions outside of the node. The-
se conditions include such as temperature, physical security, and especially in 
cognitive radios, spectrum usage conditions.  
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The threat management element adds risk assessment capabilities to the cognitive 
CND. The purpose is to build and maintain SA of risks and risk levels in a cogni-
tive network. The threat management element includes a threat management pro-
cess and a threat database in each cognitive network node. The management pro-
cess described in [20] consists of threat identification, risk assessment and miti-
gation trade-off sub processes as shown in Figure 8. The threat identification el-
ement receives information from several security sensors and databases, and then 
calculates and enumerates the threats and sets out intrusion/attack scenarios, and 
identifies the relevant vulnerabilities. 
 
 
  
Figure 8. The threat management element 
 
The risk assessment sub process quantifies the risk for each intrusion scenario 
through the use of event history databases, and policies and mitigation strategies. 
Quantifying the risk can be done using historical data or statistical sampling. Al-
so, an expert opinion may be needed when relevant data is missing, but in the CN 
context this manual evaluation is not desired. The cyber event or incident may 
not always result in the same consequences. A number of consequences with dif-
fering probabilities (for instance, an attack on a network may result in a tempo-
rary outage of one workstation at one extreme, and a complete extended loss of 
the network at the other) may exists. In this cognitive network context, the ex-
pected damage from the event or incident is then the sum of the probabilities of 
each possible consequence. 
 
At the final stage the mitigation trade-off sub process calculates the trade-off cost 
of mitigation against the risks. The process provides an adaptation map in which 
different responses to an incident are shown in a sense of costs. The costs of mit-
igation include such attributes as service availability, connectivity, security lev-
els, etc. 
 
The purpose of the vulnerability management element is to provide knowledge 
about a current system configuration and vulnerability situation within this con-
figuration. The management element has an ability to identify, classify, remedi-
ate, and mitigate vulnerabilities [21]. In this model, this refers to software vul-
nerabilities in the computing systems of a cognitive network. In practice, the vul-
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nerability management provides an automated software patching system for a 
cognitive networking system. Knowledge of vulnerabilities is also used for the 
previously described threat management. Vulnerabilities allow an attacker to de-
sign and execute hostile actions against the defended system. 
 
The SA engine collects information from the threat and vulnerability manage-
ment elements, and from all sensors. Based on all available information the SA 
engine generates the best possible situational understanding. A number of differ-
ent techniques can be used for data-mining, correlation, neural computing, and 
other data processing applications.  
 
4.3 Security control management 
 
The function of the network security control management is to adapt and config-
ure all security controls throughout the entire network. The security control man-
agement consists of a management element and configurable security controls. 
The main task of the management element is to shape a decision into new pa-
rameters for security controls of each layer. After the new parameters are gener-
ated, the parameters are distributed and updated to the security controls. 
 
Table 3. Security controls at each layer 
 
 
Security controls are provided with a large variety of security mechanisms and 
methods [22]. Each mechanism efforts to protect the system against cyber at-
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tacks, and thus meet the goal of the security measures (confidentiality, availabil-
ity, integrity, etc.). The cognitive CND model do not describe exactly all the rel-
evant security methods. Within the model, it is possible to use traditional or new 
security control techniques. A basic requirement is that a security control is ad-
justable by software. Thus, for example firewall rules, cryptography key lengths 
or service access lists must be modifiable through the cognitive process. 
 
Table 3 illustrates examples of security controls at each layer. The list is not 
complete, but it shows that there are many mechanisms to enhance security in 
communications networks. In a cognitive environment, parameter adjustability is 
a important function. The last column of the table considers these parameters that 
are to be adjusted during the cognitive process. 
 
One of the key issues with the cognitive CND model is how to protect the cogni-
tive process itself. Network-wide cognitive behaviour depends on information 
sharing between the network nodes. This information sharing must also meet all 
the security requirements. Of course, all the security controls are available, but a 
challenge is the performance of a mobile node. Control information causes lots of 
“overhead” on communication links, which may lead to link capacity and e.g. 
battery life-time problems specially in mobile wireless nodes. 
 
 
5. Evaluation and Implementation Challenges 
 
This section discusses on architecture evaluation and implementation challenges 
within the proposed model. Security architecture evaluation is important to en-
sure that the architectural model meets all critical requirements before the model 
is implemented and tested in a real-life environment. 
 
5.1 About architecture evaluation techniques 
 
Reference [23] introduces four types of architectural assessment for evaluation. 
These are mathematical modelling, simulation-based, scenario-based and experi-
ence-based assessment. Mathematical modelling can be appropriate for attributes 
where the requirement defines the exact desired system behaviour (e.g. perform-
ance). It could be impossible to develop a mathematical model which accurately 
measures the level of security provided by an architectural model. 
 
Simulation is usually conducted using an executable model of the software archi-
tecture. The technique requires that simulated attacks are relevant, and because 
the overall architecture is an incomplete, a complete penetration testing with the 
full range of potential attacks cannot be carried out. 
 
Scenario-based evaluation is based on a set of scenarios that are developed to 
convey the actual meaning of the security requirement. For network security 
evaluation, scenarios are typically attack scenarios that describe certain attack 
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types or techniques. The effectiveness of the scenario-based evaluation relies on 
the accuracy of the representative scenarios. In experience-based assessment, se-
curity experts use their experience and intuition to logically validate certain de-
sign decisions. The method is more subjective than the others, but it can be bene-
ficial if it is combined with a scenario-based method. 
 
In this paper, a full-scale evaluation is no conducted because of limited space, 
and no specific evaluation method is chosen. Further research could include sce-
nario-based evaluation with e.g. the scenarios of node-capture, sensor violation, 
and Denial-of-Service attacks. However, some evaluation is provided by consid-
ering defence in depth aspect. 
 
5.2 Defence in depth 
 
Security requirements, goals, and operating environment are key issues when we 
evaluate the architectural model. Applicability of security mechanisms depends 
primarily on where security requirements are located throughout the cognitive 
network, and what those requirements are. Reference [22] introduces a security 
zones approach for security evaluation which is depicted in Figure 9. There may 
be requirements and cyber security goals for different levels of security, coupled 
to certain user groups, their applications and devices. Each security zone has spe-
cific security requirements and thus implemented security controls. 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Security evaluation using security zones 
 
The first zone (Level 1) covers the entire cognitive network and provides a gen-
eral level of security to all users, applications, and devices. The second, third and 
fourth (Levels 2, 3, and 4) zone provides a higher level of security for a group of 
users, applications, or devices, whose security requirements are different from 
the rest of the network. For example, processed and shared data has a higher clas-
sification level, and thus more security controls are needed. The fifth zone (Level 
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5) provides a higher security between this cognitive network and all external 
networks. 
 
The security zones approach meets the defence in depth requirements when ac-
cess to the most critical data is layered so that a user must bypass several security 
control layers to reach critical data. Figure 9 shows an example of three defensive 
control layers at the network level (nodes L1-L3). At each layer (node), appropri-
ate security controls are implemented to slow an attacker’s movement towards 
critical data. Once the attacker reaches the destination node there are still the next 
layer security controls to penetrate (see Figure 3). 
 
5.3 Implementation challenges 
 
The implementation of the proposed architectural model meets number of chal-
lenges. The main challenges are targeted to the cognitive process which requires 
well-functioning decision-making. Major challenges are described in the follow-
ing. 
 
Decision process is based on algorithms which should generate the best decision 
for each situation. Automated decision-making is always related to quality and 
amount of input information. Human-based decision-making is much more effec-
tive compared to a computational process. The automated decision-making is 
typically an optimizing problem [24]. Several optimization schemes based on 
learning are available in the literature, like neural networks, genetic algorithms, 
ant-colony optimization, etc., but the use of them requires further analysis and 
research. 
 
Learning process is in a key role when devices’ or networks’ behavior is im-
proved by learning from past decisions. The design of the appropriate learning 
algorithm represents a challenge already by itself, and measurements which 
should be employed by learning open even new issues related to which meas-
urements to use and how to perform them. 
 
Situational Awareness establishment is critical for decision-making. Thus, it is 
vital to create formal and unambiguous SA for decision-making algorithms. Dif-
ferent SA input sources (vulnerabilities, threats, security parameters, etc.) must 
be shape into a common format. 
 
Threat and vulnerability management faces a challenge of information updating. 
Threat and vulnerability management should be based more on anomalous be-
haviour than signature libraries. In a complex system it could be challenging to 
maintain coherent threat and vulnerability libraries distributed among the net-
work nodes. Attacker may use zero-day attacks which are not detected by signa-
ture-based IPSs. 
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Data repository replication should be accurate, reliable and light-weight. Keep-
ing distributed data synchronized in a dynamic military network is very resource-
consuming. To provide ideal replication between the databases, the nodes should 
remain connectivity and sufficient bandwidth capacity continuously. Bandwidth 
requirements are high when data must be kept synchronized in millisecond peri-
ods. That requires a real-time replication mechanism. Lots of methods are devel-
oped for replication, but most of them are not very effective in dynamic envi-
ronments. 
 
System complexity creates new attack surfaces for an attacker. The more complex 
systems are the more they include software code, configurable parameters, inter-
faces, and running processes. In some cases, it could not be possible to evaluate 
and test the entire system against all possible threats. Continuous attack devel-
opment means that there are always unknown threats existing. 
 
 
6. Conclusion   
 
Cognitive networks are a promising research area for future military networking. 
In theory, the cognitive networks will improve network performance, resilience, 
and self-organizing, and security. Situational Awareness (SA) and adaptation ca-
pabilities are the key enablers to enhance the level of security. 
 
Cyber threats are growing, and new vulnerabilities are found continuously. At the 
same time, criminals and other actors develop new cyber weapons that exploit 
those vulnerabilities in networks, devices and applications. Cognitive networks 
will open new potential attack surfaces such as situational awareness, decision-
making and adaptation processes. The performance of the cognitive networks de-
pends on these complex processes and all control information shared between 
cognitive nodes. 
 
Computer Network Defence (CND) sets high-level requirements for military 
communication networks. Failing to protect classified information may cause se-
vere consequences in military operations. Due to the growing cyber threats, a 
CND architectural model for the cognitive military networks must be designed 
outside the box. This paper proposed a model in which the main functionalities 
are the SA, Network Security Control elements and Active Defence elements. All 
the elements are part of the cognitive process. The SA element collects security 
related information for decision-making. Based on decisions, the control element 
adjusts security control parameters in a network node. Similarly, the active de-
fence element (randomly) adjusts device and application configurations to make 
an attacker’s target non-static. 
 
The proposed model is a rough approach, and still faces several implementation 
challenges and future research areas. The model must be evaluated using differ-
ent scenarios with the most likely and dangerous situations. The evaluation is 
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critical when proving the ability of the model or architecture to meet the security 
requirements. Further research includes sensors types, decision-making algo-
rithms, adjustable security controls, and performance calculations. Also informa-
tion sharing in the cognitive process needs more research as it is seen a weak 
point of the cognitive system. The idea of dynamic, continuously changing ser-
vice configuration is interesting, but requires more studying. Especially, configu-
ration rules and potential applications should be considered. 
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Abstract  
 
The term Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) is a part of cyber warfare, 
where the final aim is to gather intelligence from the target network and systems. 
This article describes briefly the process, phases and tools for CNE. We notice, 
that CNE in many ways is similar to attacks used by hackers/crackers, but there 
are differences also. Especially when the target is military or other state 
authority, the CNE process must be carried out carefully, so that it is not 
detected. This means, that it needs a lot of time and resources, as the target 
network is highly secured. 
 
 
Design/methodology/approach 
 
The article is basically based on the book [2], which was dedicated for this 
seminar. Information from a few other sources is added. 
 
 
Findings 
 
This is a pure literature study any new findings are not introduced. 
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Cyber warfare, computer networks, exploitation, security, intelligence, 
reconnaissance, surveillance, counter-intelligence 
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1. Introduction 
 
Generally, in the field of IT security, there is a competition between the crackers 
and other hostile people and organizations, who tries to break in to systems, and 
the “good” ones, who try to build more secure systems, put up barriers, try to 
discover what is happen and last but not least, patch the existing security holes, 
as soon as they are found. Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) in military 
context is not only about breaking in to systems, but it is indeed a part of it. Also 
the growth and integration of various systems and network services, bringing 
new dimensions to the way people work, sometimes even introducing new 
paradigms, may introduce new security holes, either caused by the systems 
themselves, their interaction or contradictions between on one hand openness, 
ability to communicate and perform task better, and on the other hand various 
security measures. Even simple examples – either from traditional way of using 
systems and components, or from world-wide social networks, also indicates that 
security measures are not unambiguous. Solving one problem may introduce 
another. Just think about encrypting data on a media. If the password, passphrase, 
or whatever used to enable use of the media gets lost or is forgotten, the data is 
lost, unless we have a backup, which is reasonable up to date, and which is 
accessible when the data is required. 
 
What is CNE? In [1] it is defined as “enabling operations and intelligence 
collection capabilities conducted through the use of computer networks to gather 
data from target or adversary automated information systems or networks”. In 
other words, we can think of CNE as a cyber warfare equivalent of spying [2]. In 
the cyber world, there is less need for the spies and intruders to be physically 
present in the counter-parts sites, but it seems that many similar methods are 
applied also here. Or let’s say, the process does not necessarily involve only 
sitting behind a computer; the most effective CNE operations may be a 
combination of traditional intelligence and hacking/cracking. 
 
As a thread of this article, chapter 8 of the course book [2] assigned for this 
seminar is applied. Additionally I have looked at some of the tools. A more 
detailed examination of the tools, not to mention practicing CNE methods, 
require, however, much more time, resources and to be “useful” on inter-state 
level, experience preferable as a full-time worker in these tasks. On the other 
hand, a“spy” or full-time cracker with access to top-secret information could 
neither for his own safety nor because of his secrecy obligation reveal hardly 
anything at all for a publication like this.  
 
In section 2 the topic is described in more detail and the parties involved are 
explained. Additionally, some related concepts are defined. Section 3 describes 
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Open source Intelligence (OSINT), section 4 reconnaissance and Section 5 
surveillance, including advanced persistence threat. 
 
 
2. Research Work 
 
2.1 The concept CNE and its scope 
 
The term computer network exploitation (CNE) is related to the terms computer 
network attack (CNA) and computer network defence (CND). Together these 
three form computer network operations (CNO) [1].  
 
Computer network attack (CNA) is defined in [1] as “actions taken through the 
use of computer networks to disrupt, eny, degrade, or destroy information 
resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks 
themselves”. 
 
Computer network defence (CND) consists of “actions taken through the use of 
computer networks to protect, monitor, analyze, detect and respond to 
unauthorized activity within Department of Defence information systems and 
computer networks”. Let’s still repeat the definition of CNE: “enabling 
operations and intelligence collection capabilities conducted through the use of 
computer networks to gather data from target or adversary automated 
information systems or networks” 
 
Particularly, the book [2] notes that CNE is not about gaining privileges or shells 
on the remote systems, as some crackers who misuse other’s computers usually 
tend to do when they send out spam or carry out distributed denial of service 
(DDoS) attacks. Nevertheless, this statement did not quite convince me, and I 
rather feel that this kind of hacking, or something close to it, actually is a part of 
CNE. But indeed, CNE is a larger concept. 
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Figure 1. Relation between CNO and CNE 
 
Even if civil crackers have advanced from the script kids type to international 
criminals, who carry out directed attacks, in order to bring an organization or to 
gain economic winnings, there are differences between these CNE, particularly 
when we look at it in a military context. Civil attacks are usually discovered, 
when something happens, i.e. the intruders have successfully carried out their 
operation. They also make use of badly protected systems and users, who haven’t 
the capabilities to defend themselves against these attacks, and certainly don’t 
even understand when and where they are exposed to dangers. On the other hand, 
even highly authorized persons are still humans and there is no reason why they 
couldn’t make similar mistakes. Comparing attacks in general and CNE,I see two 
main differences: 
 
1. Critical information systems are highly protected, and their connections to 
the Internet are often indirect [2, 3, 4]. Actions and connections are 
monitored in order to detect and defend against attacks and other misuse. 
Also, vulnerabilities, which may not be patched on commercial systems 
are likely to be patched in critical environments. All this makes it much 
more difficult for the attacker. 
 
2. In CNE, it is preferable if the operations leave as little tracks as possible, 
that would enable the counter-part to detect, or even suspect that anything 
is being carried out. Where the intention of an attack, either in civil 
context or in warfare, may be to cause damage, the intention in 
exploitation operations is reversed. If damage would happen, it is likely 
that the operation would be discovered and would be discontinued. If 
furthermore the actors are discovered, it is likely that they will run into 
disputes. 
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In other words, it is like comparing bank robbery and spying in the physical 
world. 
 
2.2 Sources of cyber attacks? 
 
The endpoint(s) from where the attack seems to originate, may be only a 
compromised intermediate system, acting as a proxy for the attack. The attacker 
may use a botnet or some kind of anonymous service, which disguises both 
identity and origin [2]. More, if these intermediate networks enable splitting up 
communication, it may be difficult to find the origin even based on logs. If the 
attack is not interactive, but the compromised proxy is instructed to operate later, 
like in a typical Denial of Service (DoS) attack, it may not at all be possible to 
find the origin. Even if the intermediate network is more straightforward, the 
attacker would likely use a chain of proxies, preferably in different locations, and 
such which don’t necessarily keep any log of their traffic. The longer the chain 
is, the harder it is to find the originating attacker, of course. 
 
Acting directly, without unstable intermediate systems may in some cases be 
more effective and particularly faster, but it is also risky, as the Internet Service 
Provider (ISP) may shut down the connection for the attacker, if an attack is 
reported [2]. This is the case at least in some countries. 
 
We could of course argue, isn’t it self-evident that a connection from which 
attacks or “illegal” traffic is generated should be shut down? The network 
operator would do so temporarily, in order to resume stable operation of network 
or the target’s system. In that case they should also inform the owner of the 
connection, and reconnect the line when the problem is solved. As we see above, 
the users behind that connection may be guilty of performing attacks, but as well 
completely unaware of their system being compromised. 
 
In cyber warfare the attackers may be roughly categorized in  
 Governmental/state organizations or actors, which are sponsored by states 
and operate on behalf of states, and  
 Non-government sponsored organizations, e.g. political, activist or 
terrorist organizations, corporations, criminals, or even individuals. 
 
2.3 Phases of CNE 
 
The book [2] divided cyber reconnaissance into three categories, which roughly 
could be considered as three phases: open source intelligence (OSINT), passive 
reconnaissance and advanced persistent threat (APT).  
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The limits between these three categories are not sharp. We can actually consider 
a growing degree of intrusion along the CNE process. As the actor digs deeper 
into the target’s systems and networks, the risk that the reconnaissance is 
detected also grows. Additionally, the actor’s methods also become more illegal, 
and thus, the consequences are also more serious in case the target part detects 
suspicious traffic or actions on the systems. (Even if it would be difficult to point 
out the actor, the target organization would at least take preventing/defending 
actions.) An alternative taxonomy of CNE methods would be to add an 
additional category “active reconnaissance” between passive reconnaissance and 
APT.   
 
APT in indeed more advanced than the former ones, as it is the “final goal” here, 
and merely surveillance instead of reconnaissance. What’s the difference? That 
will be clarified in the more detailed descriptions of the CNE categories in the 
following sections. 
 
 
3. OSINT 
 
3.1 Public information 
 
Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) is the initial phase of cyber warfare related 
CNE. Here, the actor starts to use public information, which is available in 
newspapers, publically, or almost publically available reports, and similar 
sources. It is also possible to watch people moving to and from the target 
organization’s premises, find out if they are working for the organization or 
otherwise have contacts. IT system related transports to the target’s premises 
might reveal some hint of which makes of systems the organization uses. 
However, the actor has to act carefully, that their interest is not revealed. 
 
3.2 Professional information 
 
In addition to publically known information, the actor may also have access to 
job related information, like military magazines, conference proceedings and 
classified information – if not secret information of an enemy, anyway more 
insider information than in public magazines. 
 
3.3 Internet searching 
 
Those sources mentioned above did not yet include the Internet. Nowadays 
searching robots in Internet (Google, etc.) is the fastest way to find information. 
Choosing the right search terms is important in free text search, otherwise there 
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is either zero or very few search results, or so many that it may be difficult to 
pick those of value. Metadata based search can be more effective.  
 
3.4 Social media and cloud computing 
 
As sources of information, we should not forget the web 2.0 paradigm in the 
Internet. The two categories, which I have in mind here are various cloud 
computing and social media.  
 
I do not here try to give any definition of cloud computing, neither will I go very 
deep into the science on how these may be used for CNO. Anyway, various kind 
of information may be stored in the Internet on some server, which location is 
not necessarily even known, most likely in a virtual server– which is perhaps 
doesn’t matter here, as the data anyway has to be stored somewhere. The level 
and categories vary, but data may anyway be private, shared (among a group or 
dedicated users), or it may be public. 
 
Take Dropbox as an example [15]. Usually the files are encrypted and requires 
authentication. It is also possible to share files through web, but only if the owner 
decides to do that. Conceptually that sounds very good. Yet, it is not considered 
completely trustworthy, because security has at some point of time been 
temporarily broken, and the files would at that point have been potentially 
accessible by anyone, see for example [16]. 
 
Especially among young people, various social media services are much used. 
Social media sites may of course also, if not mostly be variants of cloud services, 
so the two types of services are certainly overlapping. Naturally, when 
computing, communication and information move from stationary devices to 
clouds, the crackers and other parties, which try to misuse information, earn on it 
or otherwise make harm, also move there. Obviously, it is easy to spread 
malware through social media, and if some user in the target organization 
happens to download it, the attacker may be in. 
 
Employers’ attitude towards social media as professional communication 
channels varies from forbidding to promoting. As the phenomenon is fairly new, 
there may not even be clear guidelines for how social media should be used. For 
CNE/CNO actors, we shall not either underestimate cloud and social media 
services as sources of information. Say, the CNE actor knows from his work 
activity, that A is a highly authorized insider person in the target organization. 
From various social media it could be find out who are A’s friends, his/her 
interests, etc. Even if A should not disclose any confidential data on such 
sources, this may still happen, directly if A does not care, know or understand the 
importance or classification of some fact, or indirectly if for example some of 
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A’s friends or friends’ friend may have revealed a bit too much. Alternatively the 
actor may find several small facts, which put together can be used to find out 
about the target. 
 
3.5 DNS, etc. 
 
In CNE, it is more important to find out about the systems and networks, and 
finding out about the people is only an intermediate phase. To find DNS 
information is the next step. Tools and commands, which can be used here are: 
 
 nslookup (especially in interactive mode)  
 dig 
 whois 
 finger 
 dnsenum 
 
The list below shows an example of what can be retrieved using the whois 
command: 
 
 
whois 130.188.4.36 
# 
# Query terms are ambiguous.  The query is assumed  
to be: 
#     "n 130.188.4.36" 
# 
# Use "?" to get help. 
# 
… 
… (Information about ARIN and whois deleted) 
… 
% Note: this output has been filtered. 
% To receive output for a database update, use 
  the "-B" flag. 
 
% Information related to '130.188.0.0 –  
130.188.255.255' 
 
inetnum: 130.188.0.0 - 130.188.255.255 
remarks: 
 
remarks:    This inetnum has been transfered  
    as part of the ERX. 
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remarks: It was present in both the ARIN and  
    RIPE databases, so 
remarks: the information from both databases  
    has been merged. 
remarks: If you are the mntner of this  
    object, please update it 
remarks: to reflect the correct information. 
remarks: 
remarks: Please see the information for this  
process: 
remarks: http://www.ripe.net/projects/erx/ 
    erx-ip/network130.html 
remarks: 
remarks: **** INFORMATION FROM ARIN OBJECT **** 
remarks:  netname: VTTNET 
descr:     Technical Research Centre of Finland 
descr:  Vuorimiehentie 5 
descr:  Espoo, 02044 VTT 
remarks:  country: FI 
admin-c:    VS1745-RIPE 
tech-c:   VS1745-RIPE 
remarks:  changed: hostmaster@arin.net 19880919 
remarks:   changed: hostmaster@arin.net 20000728 
remarks:   **** INFORMATION FROM RIPE OBJECT **** 
netname:   VTTNET 
descr:     Finnish State Research Centre 
descr:    FINLAND 
country:   FI 
admin-c:   JR2592-RIPE 
tech-c:   VS1745-RIPE 
remarks:  rev-srv:        vtt.fi 
remarks:   rev-srv:        hydra.helsinki.fi 
mnt-by:   AS565-MNT 
status:   EARLY-REGISTRATION 
source:    RIPE # Filtered 
remarks:  rev-srv attribute deprecated by  
    RIPE NCC on 02/09/2009 
 
person:   Jan Rautalin 
address:   Vuorimiehentie 5 
 
phone:     +358 20 722 4107 
nic-hdl:  JR2592-RIPE 
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source:    RIPE # Filtered 
 
person:    Veikko Suutari 
address:   VTT 
           Vuorimiehentie 5 
address:   02044 VTT 
phone:    +358405899147 
nic-hdl:   VS1745-RIPE 
source:   RIPE # Filtered 
 
% Information related to '130.188.0.0/16AS565' 
 
route:   130.188.0.0/16 
descr:    VTTNET 
origin:  AS565 
mnt-by:    AS565-MNT 
source:   RIPE # Filtered 
% This query was served by the RIPE Database Query  
Service version 1.19.5 (WHOIS2) 
 
 
Figure 2. Use of whois command 
 
The information, which can be retrieved from various name servers and hosts 
using these commands vary, but the actor may anyway find out a lot about the 
network hierarchy, etc. Even if this is public information, there is a risk that an 
excessive investigation of a specific organization’s network may be noticed, thus 
it would be safer for the actor to either hide behind for example The Onion 
Router (Tor), or to use web services, where these services are implemented.  
 
 
Figure 3. OSINT process [2] 
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3.6 SIGINT 
 
In addition to OSINT, also signals intelligence (SIGINT) may be used to capture 
information [5].If the actor can get physically close enough, eavesdropping is an 
effective method. Copper or fiber cables may be difficult to access, but wireless 
LANs could be easily eavesdropped. Of course, traffic is encrypted, but media 
access control (MAC) addresses are anyway possible to find out. The MAC 
address reveals also the manufacturer of the network interface card [6]. 
 
 
4. Reconnaissance 
 
4.1 Characteristics of reconnaissance 
 
The intention of the reconnaissance phases is to invent and enumerate the target 
network and systems and do reconnaissance on it in more detail, until it is 
possible to access vulnerabilities. In [2] the actions described in this section are 
referred to as passive reconnaissance, as they are not attacks against the target 
system itself. An example mentioned is compromising a router, and slowing 
down other routes in order to route the target’s traffic through the compromised 
router. Reconnaissance involves more direct actions to extract information from 
the target than OSINT. Information gathered with OSINT means may be utilized 
in this phase.  
 
Even if the reconnaissance actions at least in initial steps are passive, they may 
be considered as attacks. The example of compromising a router is certainly an 
illegal action. As this also will alter the traffic pattern, it may be detected, either 
by the target (that at some point of time will recognize that their traffic is slowed 
down or uses other routes than generally) or the network operator, which also 
through network management notices the performance changes. A way for the 
attacker to hide the action would be to interfere with some event, which naturally 
causes a change in the traffic pattern, for example when some router is down or a 
new system is tested. 
 
4.2 How to avoid detection 
 
Generally, as mentioned in section 2, the actor should spread the actions, so that 
they seem to originate from varying IP addresses, preferably geographically in 
different countries. The actions can also be spread over a longer period of time 
than would be done in usual attacks, or when legally testing. Together, this 
would probably make the actions immune to intrusion detection systems (IDS) 
and intrusion prevention systems (IPS) [2].  
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Of course, traffic analyzing theory and more practically, knowledge of what is 
general traffic and what is not, is increasing by time. According to this increased 
knowledge, IDSs and IPSs can be better programmed and tuned, but still, 
distinguish normal traffic variations from attacks is difficult. A too paranoid 
tuning of the IDSs and IPSs would result in a lot of false positives. 
 
4.3 Phases in reconnaissance 
 
The reconnaissance process goes as follows [2]: 
 
1. Enumeration of the environment. This means making a scheme of the 
network architecture of the target: the routes and addresses. Information 
from the OSINT phases helps here but also eavesdropping or wire-
tapping. Network sniffers and various scanning tools will be used.  
2. Use of port scanner(s) to find open ports.nmap is a commonly used port 
scanner program. 
3. Testing of services on the open ports. 
4. Fingerprint operation system(s) 
5. Finally the actor accesses vulnerabilities. A useful tool for this step is 
Nessus. 
 
4.4 Vulnerabilities 
 
In critical environments it is likely that commonly known vulnerabilities are 
patched (not all, however, Microsoft’s Internet Explorer seems still to suffer from 
the vulnerability mentioned in [7]. Not even their latest patch prevents one from 
jamming it.) In general, the actor trying to access vulnerabilities has to look for 
zero day vulnerabilities, i.e. such which are not commonly known. 
 
Tools used in addition to port scanners are specific fingerprinting tools and 
banner grabbing tools [8]. The latter are used to list services. Some common 
tools, which may be used in CNE are listed in [9]. 
 
4.5 CNE process steps and intrusiveness 
 
Figure 4 lists some CNE actions starting from such described in the OSINT 
section and ending with advanced persistent threat (APT), which is the “final 
goal” described in next section. The position on the Y-axis indicates 
intrusiveness versus openness of the action. The figure shall not be used to give 
objective values for how intrusive an action is, it is more of ordering the actions 
or methods mutually. Of course, this ordering is not either fixed, the actor may 
return to a previous method if needed, or of course pass some method if it is not 
worth the effort. The order is partly based on the figures in [2] and partly on my 
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subjective opinions. As already stated, the more intrusive the actions are, the 
bigger risk it is also for the actor. Roughly, the actor would also more seriously 
break the law when the CNE advances. Exceptions may be service interrogation 
and OS fingerprinting, which may vary from case to case. Systematic port 
scanning is certainly illegal.  
 
 
 
Figure 4. Some actions in the CNE process in a growing scale of 
intrusiveness. The scale is not intended to be linear or objectively 
measured 
 
 
5. Surveillance 
 
5.1 Reconnaissance vs. surveillance 
 
After finding vulnerabilities in the target’s network, CNE will gradually be 
extended towards surveillance. The difference between reconnaissance and 
surveillance is that reconnaissance implies single observations of the target 
environment, whereas surveillance is implies ongoing observations [2, 11]. It 
usually takes several months or even years, before the attacker withdraws or the 
attack is detected [13]. At least some of the tools and techniques, which are used 
for reconnaissance, could in principle also be used for surveillance, but in 
continuous use, there is a higher risk that they are discovered. Examples of 
surveillance actions are WikiLeaks’s exfiltration of U.S. State information and 
the Night Dragon APT [13]. In addition to states, surveillance may also be 
domestic, for example industry espionage. 
 
Surveillance of voice and data communication needs insertion of software and/or 
hardware into the target environment. Wire-tapping is regulated by law, but 
network centers have tools for lawful interception. This is used when the police 
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needs to wiretap phone calls and SMSs of suspected criminals, and certainly also 
to find possible terrorists. Can we trust in authorities that they do not misuse 
lawful interception? Probably not, it depends on the country. Foreign calls may 
be a significant risk as well as domestic traffic routed via foreign countries. 
According to [2], laws are not necessarily followed to letter, or it may be 
completely ignored. 
 
5.2 Advanced persistent threat 
 
Advanced persistent threat (APT) is a form of surveillance, defined as “an 
organized long term attack, designed to access and exfiltrate information from 
the target systems” [2]. The role of the actor is considerable more active than 
during the reconnaissance phase. Actually, APT is similar to an attack in general. 
In both cases, the attacker exploits one or more vulnerabilities in the target 
system, and possible inserts malware. The difference is that, when general 
crackers’ attacks often cause significant damage, this is usually avoided in APT. 
The attacker wants still to operate unnoticed, as it then would be possible to 
conduct the surveillance for a longer time, once the target system is successfully 
attacked. The attacker’s final goal is to be able to extract the intelligence 
continuously.  
 
APT involves three steps [2] 
 attack 
 escalate 
 exfiltrate. 
 
 
5.2.1 Attack phase 
 
The attack may occur at the client side, and/or custom malware may be used. If 
the vulnerability is not commonly known, and the malware is new, programmed 
and tuned for this specific purpose, it is very possible that the attack would be 
successful, especially if it is not too aggressive. 
 
Botnets may be used for the attack. The principle of botnets is explained in [10]. 
The bot or robot means here a program that either executes small repetitive tasks 
on its own or acts as an agent, performing tasks controlled by the attacker. When 
the bot somehow, for example via a download or an email attachment, is loaded 
to a computer, the attacker may instruct the bot to execute tasks without the 
owner of the computer knowing it. When several computers are infected by the 
same bot, they form a botnet. A computer in the botnet is also called zombie. 
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The attacker, also called botherder instructs the bots via a command and control 
infrastructure (C&C), see figure 5. Typical attacks are sending spam, DDoS 
attacks, spreading of itself and other malware. 
 
5.2.2 Escalation phase 
 
In the escalation phase, the actor tries to get access to the desired                           
information, which usually means rising the credentials. It may not be necessary 
to have root access, it is more important to gain just the rights needed. In some 
cases, it is also possible that the attacker gets directly enough rights to access the 
desired information, and escalation is not needed. 
 
This may involve password cracking. Tools like Cain and Abel, hydra and john 
the ripper may be used for this. A tools, which combines several attack methods 
is Metasploit. 
 
5.2.3 Exfiltration phase 
 
The last phase of APT is exfiltration of the information. This means that 
information which interests the attacker (or the mandatory of the attacker) must 
be collected, temporarily stored and finally somehow transferred out of the target 
system.   
 
 
Figure 5. Botnet 
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The ways the attackers can use for exfiltration of information is described in 
[12]. As in the previous phases, the attacker may not hurry, but wait for the best 
time to start the exfiltration. They may store the data in password protected 
compressed archives.  
 
Usually the same channel is not used for breaking in to the system and exfiltrate 
data [12]. A problem in getting the data out from highly secured systems is that 
most ports may be blocked. Sometimes the attacker may install a malicious 
program on the target system for email, FTP or HTTP communication. It is, 
however, likely that even these generic protocols cannot be used directly in 
highly secured networks, but only through special arrangements, like terminal 
servers. To use them, the attacker should thus have the credentials of some real 
user. But even if the ports would be open, such channels are likely to be 
monitored. It is safer for the attacker to use some covert channel. Such a channel 
is DNS exfiltration, which is outlined in [13]. 
 
A method to hide information mentioned in [12] is to use automated time delays 
between packets. Another method – especially useful if not covered channels are 
used – is steganography. There is for example a program named Steghide [14], 
which can be used to hide a file inside a picture or other huge file, where it is 
difficult to detect. A drawback with this method is that the size of the file needs 
to be much bigger than the actual information, in which the attacker is interested. 
Thus it is more usable in cases where the information transfer itself can occur 
quite fast. In covert channels, the affective bandwidth may be quite low. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
We have realized, that CNE against a military or otherwise highly secured 
network or system requires a lot of work. On the other hand, there are the most 
fancy tools available even for free, which a skillful hacker may use. They also 
have the knowledge about vulnerabilities, which are not yet patched or maybe 
design flaws in the systems. Specific skills which the crackers have, is to 
increase their rights in the way that they can access almost any information, and 
go around almost any security measure. 
 
We have seen that the CNE process starts with OSINT, and more exactly public 
and job related information available, both in the physical world and in the 
Internet. It continues with DNS related information and similar open network 
intelligence. The next step is reconnaissance, involving scanning of target 
systems. To get into the last phase, surveillance, the target system is attacked. 
The attacker insert tools, which can be used to exfiltrate intelligence from the 
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target. Thus, CNE is slowly advancing intrusion, which from the start to the end 
should be hidden if it’s going to be successful. But the intention of CNE is not to 
damage the target system as attacks in general. 
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Abstract 
 
The growing importance of cyberspace to modern society, and its increasing use 
as an arena for dispute, is becoming a national security concern for governments 
and armed forces globally. The special characteristics of cyberspace, such as its 
asymmetric nature, the lack of attribution, the low cost of entry, the legal 
ambiguity, and its role as an efficient medium for protest, crime, espionage and 
military aggression, makes it an attractive domain for nation-states as well as 
non-state actors in cyber conflict. 
 
This paper studies the various non-state actors who coexist in cyberspace, 
examines their motives and incitements, and analyzes how and when their 
objectives coincide with those of nation-states. Literature suggests that many 
nations are currently pursuing cyber warfare capabilities, oftentimes by 
leveraging criminal organizations and irregular forces. Employment of such non-
state actors as hacktivists, patriot hackers, and cyber militia in state-on-state 
cyberspace operations has also proved to be a usable model for conducting cyber 
attacks. The paper concludes that cyberspace is emerging as a new tool for state 
power that will likely reshape future warfare. However, due to the lack of 
concrete cyber warfare experience, and the limited encounters of legitimate cyber 
attacks, it is hard to precisely assess future effects, risks and potentials. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The world is becoming completely hooked on information and communications 
technology (ICT). Almost alarmingly so. Large parts of our daily lives are 
shaped by computers, smartphones, the Internet and scores of unseen ICT-
dependent societal services that we take for granted, such as electricity, clean 
water and sewage, food, healthcare, mass transit, heating, and security. The 
increasing integration of computer and network technology into the critical 
infrastructures supporting these services, and the complex interdependencies 
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created by sector-spanning information requirements, certainly makes the offered 
services, efficient, accessible and “smart”, but at the same time vulnerable to 
single points of failure and adversary attacks. During the last decade, between 
2000 and 2010, global Internet usage increased by over 500 %, growing from 
360 million to 2 billion users [60]. As more people are getting online, cyberspace 
is becoming a defining feature of modern life, where individuals and 
communities are socializing and organizing themselves across national borders 
and traditional sociocultural boundaries. Cyberspace is thus becoming 
increasingly woven into the fabric of everyday life, and has brought with it many 
opportunities and positive changes as well as new threats to our society. 
 
For private as well as public sectors, cyberspace has rapidly become an important 
environment, generating new business models and offering easy access to people, 
in their roles as customers and citizens. Large parts of trade, media distribution 
and social services around the globe are now dependent on pervasive 
communications networks, such as the Internet, or various forms of cloud-based 
infrastructures. Through its high-speed development cycles, cyberspace has 
become an incubator for ever evolving forms of entrepreneurship, technology 
advancement and spread of free speech that reflects the proliferation of 
democratic values and principles. 
 
Cyberspace has also brought with it several new threats. The fact that cyber-
dependency has become so widespread in society, with complex interconnections 
between various sectors, has increased vulnerability to attacks against both 
civilian and military infrastructures. We have thus seen an increased focus on 
cyber defence within armed forces and national security organizations in many 
parts of the world. Within the military, cyberspace has been identified as a new 
fifth arena, besides land, sea, air and space, in which military operations can be 
performed [43]. These operations, called cyberspace operations, include both 
offensive and defensive measures, and may be performed independently or as a 
complement to conventional warfare. 
 
Although nation-states might seem to be the most likely main players in a future 
full-scale cyber war, recent events have shown that non-state actors might also 
play key roles during such events, and almost certainly will do so during low-
intensive cyber-skirmishes. The often cited “cyber attacks” (see later discussion 
on definitions below) on targets in Estonia in the spring of 2007 is an example of 
where volunteers actively took part in an open cyber conflict [47], acting as a sort 
of cyber militia, by rallying to overload various cyberspace resources, such as 
Estonian government and commercial web services. Another example is 
Anonymous, a collective of so-called “hacktivists”, who have been claiming 
responsibility for several widely publicized web defacements, information leaks, 
denial-of-service attacks, and other cyber actions sometimes related to national 
security or military affairs [15]. 
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Rogue malware authors and organized cyber criminals have also been very active 
during the last few years, motivated primarily by economic gain [65]. In 2009, it 
was discovered that a cyber espionage network called “GhostNet” had accessed 
confidential information belonging to both governmental and private 
organizations in over 100 countries around the world [14]. It has been claimed 
that the software, which apparently was controlled by servers located on the 
island of Hainan, China, was a tool of that government [42]. However, as China 
has officially denied all responsibility for GhostNet, and there is no conclusive 
evidence that the Chinese government is involved in its operation, others mean 
that direct accusations should be avoided [10]. 
 
As the concept of cyber warfare is becoming gradually more relevant for many 
nation-states, the need of quickly achieving a military cyberspace operation 
capability has become a top priority for armed forces and intelligence agencies 
around the world. While well-developed countries might primarily see the need 
of a defensive capability, protecting vulnerable digital resources, such as 
command and control systems, developing countries may instead recognize 
cyberspace operations as an attractive method, relatively inexpensive and 
politically risk-free, to wage war against an enemy with kinetic battlefield 
superiority. Non-state actors are thus increasingly being approached by many 
governments globally, who seek to benefit from their experience and leverage 
their cyber know-how to attain this sought-after capability [71][72][45]. This 
could be a possible explanation in the case of GhostNet, and was also posited in 
relation to the 2010 Stuxnet attacks [26] (although they were later attributed to 
the United States and Israel [54]). This is an interesting development, which 
further underlines the growing importance of the various non-state actors in 
cyberspace. 
 
This paper analyzes the use of cyberspace for armed conflict, with a focus on 
non-state actors and their relation to nation-states, and the involvement of non-
state actors in cyberspace operations. The question of what exactly cyber warfare 
is, and how it differs from classic kinetic warfare, requires some initial attention. 
Moreover, the nature of the cyberspace environment makes evaluation of 
whether certain activity is to be regarded as an act of war extremely precarious. 
To address these questions, the paper thus commences with a section on 
definitions, and presents a review of some basic warfare principles to 
differentiate cyber war from armed conflict in the traditional sense. 
 
The rest of this is paper is structured as follows; Section 2 presents related work 
previously done in the area. Section 3 offers an attempt at defining the concept of 
cyber war, in relation to its physical-world counterpart of conventional kinetic 
war, and tries to disaggregate the various cyber actions that are commonly, 
sometimes quite carelessly, bundled into the concept of cyber attack. Section 4 
describes the main relevant non-state actors in cyber conflict, and section 5 
presents some benefits and drawbacks of nation-states employing these actors, 
such as questions regarding their combatant status. A discussion of the relevance 
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of non-state actors in cyberspace operations is given in section 6. Some 
concluding remarks are offered in section 7. 
 
2. Previous Work 
 
 
Since “cyber” has become a veritable hot-topic within several different research 
areas during the past few years, quite a lot of recent work has been done on the 
subject in several sub-fields. The fast-paced technical advancement and the rapid 
development of new military doctrines, public policy and various legislation, 
does however make the area quite volatile and subject to constant change. 
 
Of the available textbooks on the subject of cyber warfare, worth mentioning is 
“Cyber Warfare: Techniques, Tactics and Tools for Security Practitioners” [2] by 
Jason Andress and Steve Winterfeld which offers a thorough introduction to 
cyberspace, its conflicts and actors. “Inside Cyber Warfare” [12] by Jeffrey Carr 
gives some good insights into the specifics of the major cyber-events that 
occurred between 2002 and 2009. The series of books including “Access 
Denied” [17], “Access Controlled” [16], and “Access Contested” [15] edited by 
Ron Deibert et al. gives a comprehensive view of the ongoing struggle for 
control of cyberspace, and the resistance it meets in many parts of the world. The 
anthology “Cyber Power and National Security” [32] edited by Kramer et al. of 
the National Defense University consists of a collection of two dozen papers on 
policy issues, governance, theories, and trends related to cyber warfare that are 
relevant in order to understand the perspectives of the U.S. and NATO. 
 
When considering the most influential paper authors in the area, Professors John 
Arquilla and Dorothy E. Denning, both at the department of Defense Analysis at 
the Naval Postgraduate School, have written several frequently cited papers 
about cyberspace security and conflict since the mid-1990s [4][5][18][19]. 
Regarding the evolving nature of cyber conflict and cyber warfare, one of the 
more productive contemporary authors is James A. Lewis, senior fellow at the 
Center for Strategic and International Studies [34][35][36][37]. Professor Ron 
Deibert director of the Citizen Lab at the Munk School of Global Affairs, 
University of Toronto, has contributed to the understanding of how power is 
exercised in cyberspace through several books and publications [14][15][16][17]. 
The use of irregular forces in cyberspace operations has been extensively covered 
by Dr. Rain Ottis of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of 
Excellence, Estonia [47][48][49]. 
 
 
3. Definitions and Principles 
 
The use of various types of cyber-related actions during an armed conflict is 
inevitable, but what is an actual cyber war, what will it look like and under what 
circumstances will militaries use cyber attacks? In media, as well as in various 
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government reports and even scientific papers, one can read about cyber warfare, 
which includes a broad range of malicious actions in cyberspace. The identities 
of those who engage in these activities are usually vague, and their intent is most 
often ambiguous. However, this uncertainty about attacker and motive does not 
justify a similar imprecision in describing the performed actions, the method of 
execution and the consequences. It is unconstructive and misleading to label 
every “bad thing” happening on the Internet as “cyber warfare” or “cyber 
terrorism,” and this type of imprecise nomenclature hampers serious discussion 
on the subject, if the terms are not properly defined. 
 
The thresholds for an attack in cyberspace, or an all-out war, should not be much 
different than those in the physical world. We can thus reduce imprecision by 
clearly separating the different kinds of malicious activities in cyberspace from 
one another, and defining the probable outcomes of these activities more 
carefully. In order to refine discussion, the following definitions are offered;  
 
Cyberspace is the global, virtual, ICT-based environment, including the Internet, 
which directly or indirectly interconnects systems, networks and other 
infrastructures critical to the needs of society. 
 
Cyber actions are a collection of predominately illegal activities in cyberspace, 
carried out by non-state actors, causing damage or disruption, in pursuit of 
various political, economic or personal goals. 
 
Cyberspace operations are military activities employing cyberspace capabilities 
in order to achieve strategic objectives or effects in or through cyberspace. 
 
Cyber attacks are a subset of cyberspace operations employing the hostile use of 
cyberspace capabilities, by nation-states or non-state actors acting on their 
behalf, to cause damage, destruction, or casualties in order to achieve military or 
political goals. 
 
Cyber war occurs when cyber attacks reach the threshold of hostilities commonly 
recognized as war by the international community and as defined by international 
law. 
 
The definitions above should not be seen as definite, and are primarily given as a 
basis for further use in this paper. They consist of incrementally improved 
versions of, and in part, amalgamation of several previous definitions 
[64][11][7]. While the first four definitions are relatively straightforward and 
easy to deduce, the concept of cyber war is still somewhat elusive. One might 
reason that cyber war is simply warfare in the cyberspace environment. However, 
this interpretation turns out to be an unhelpful oversimplification. As an example, 
the bombing of an Internet exchange point – an important infrastructure hub in 
which communications links of Internet Service Providers are interconnected in 
order to exchange data flowing between their respective customers – does not by 
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itself meet the criteria of constituting cyber war. Neither does defacing a 
government website or unleashing a massive distributed denial-of-service attack 
(DDoS), such as the ones directed towards Estonia in 2007 (at least not unless 
the attacks were sufficiently extensive and prolonged to have an effect similar to 
that of a naval blockade on the target country’s commerce [55]). Moreover, such 
a simple definition of cyber war would ignore the complexity of applying the 
more fundamental legal aspects of war to cyberspace. 
 
According to the classic Clauswitzian perception, war is “nothing but a 
continuation of political intercourse, with a mixture of other means,” and “an act 
of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfill our will.” [13] The use of 
violence, or the threat of violence, requires the use of force, which in turn 
involves inflicting physical harm or exercising coercion [35]. International law 
addresses the concept of “act of war” in terms of a “threat or use of force,” in 
accordance with the wording of the United Nations (UN) Charter [62]. A 
determination of what is a “threat or use of force” in cyberspace must thus, as in the 
physical world, be made in the context in which the performed actions occurs, and it 
involves an analysis by the affected states of the effect and purpose of the actions in 
question [61]. Certain actions conducted in cyberspace on a regular basis could 
probably constitute acts of war according to the UN Charter, and consequently 
allow legitimate use of force in self-defense. However, if the actions do not 
include violence, or the threat of violence, they cannot be defined as attacks. 
 
Discovering that your network has been penetrated, your computer’s security 
mechanisms circumvented, and that valuable or sensitive information has been 
compromised, as in the case of the previously mentioned GhostNet, could be 
intimidating to say the least. It is, however, important to differentiate between 
covert cyberspace operations that entail the use of force or violence, such as 
manipulating the chemical concentrations of a major water treatment plant, and 
pure cyber espionage. If the malware used for illicit information collection is 
intended to go undetected, and if the exploit does not cause any damage, 
destruction, or casualties, it cannot be considered to be intimidation, the use of 
force, or a cyber attack (according to the previously given definition). 
Nevertheless, there is still a quite extensive gray zone in cyberspace operations, 
especially when considering disruptive actions, and drawing the line when 
disruptive actions rise to the level of use of force, which could legally constitute 
cyber war without actual cyber attacks [7]. 
 
Cyber warfare will likely involve a plethora of actions, ranging from attacks to 
critical infrastructure, inflicting physical damage and casualties, to disruptive and 
psychological actions, bordering to the wider concept of information warfare, 
creating uncertainty and doubt among the opposing forces and its political 
leaders. The stand-off nature of cyber attacks allows for striking tactical as well 
as strategic targets from large distances, using comparatively inexpensive 
technology. However, there are simultaneously some considerable disadvantages 
of using cyber attacks. A major drawback is the lack of control and estimation of 
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collateral damage in the targeting process, especially when comparing to 
conventional kinetic attacks. The complex, interdependent nature of cyberspace 
makes it hard to evaluate if a cyber attack disabling a certain military network 
could also entail extensive unintended consequences to non-combatants, 
civilians, neutrals, or possibly even the attacker himself. This unpredictability 
creates significant political risk as unexpected collateral damage carries the 
danger of conflict escalation, may weaken the legitimacy of one’s cause in the 
eyes of the international community, can generate negative domestic reactions, 
and reinforce resistance in the targeted country or equivalent body. These 
disadvantages will likely constrain nation-states’ use of cyber attacks. 
1989 The WANK worm 
An infiltration of NASA’s computer network in protest of nuclear weapons 
and the use of radioactive plutonium to fuel the Galileo probe’s booster 
system. 
1995 The Strano Network sit-in 
A “netstrike” strike action directed against French government computers to 
protest policies on nuclear and social issues. 
1998 UrBaN Ka0s hackings 
Defacement of Indonesian government web sites focusing on the 
oppression of the people of East Timor. 
1998 Electronic Disturbance Theater’s “Web sit-ins” 
Denial-of-service attacks against the web sites of the Pentagon and 
Mexican government in support of the Zapatistas. 
1999 Team Spl0it anti-war hackings 
Web defacement calling for an end to the Kosovo conflict. 
 
Table 1.  Early examples of non-state “hacktivism” cyber actions 
 
A way of resolving the aforementioned political backlashes of cyber attacks, 
besides exploiting the covert nature of cyberspace to circumvent attribution, is 
the employment of non-state actors in cyberspace operations. Some of the most 
common actors in cyberspace are discussed in the following section. 
 
 
4. Actors in Cyberspace 
 
Cyberspace is a global domain, available for almost anyone with access to a 
computer with an internet connection, a smartphone or any other type of uplinked 
multimedia device. In this domain many different actors exist in parallel, with 
varying needs, goals and intentions. Some act alone, others in loosely connected 
networks or more formal structures. The roles may also vary depending on the 
situation, and may overlap. Actors can move between categories over time and 
depending on their current aims and goals. 
 
Besides all positive things cyberspace has begot, it has simultaneously been a 
medium used in conflict for more than two decades. In cyberspace, rivaling 
hacker gangs actively confront one another, protest groups voice their opinions 
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through virtual vandalism, criminal organizations disseminate malware in pursuit 
of easy profits, and shady actors engage in illicit intelligence gathering. As 
shown in Table 1 above, early instances of cyber actions (see previous definition) 
date back to late 1980s, and continue on during the 1990s. However, none of 
these were committed by governments or were clearly tied to state-level 
conflicts. Rather, they were committed by non-state groups quarrelling with their 
own kind and with international governments. 
Actor Motivation Target Method 
Ordinary citizens None (or weak) Any Indirect 
Individuals, 
companies, 
governments 
Previously written 
scripts and tools Script kiddies Curiosity, thrills, ego 
Protests via web 
page defacements 
or DDoS attacks 
Political or social 
change 
Decision makers or 
innocent victims Hacktivists 
Ego, personal 
animosity, economic 
gain 
Malware, viruses, 
vulnerability exploits Black-hat hackers Any 
Penetration testing, 
patching 
Idealism, creativity,  
respect for the law Any White-hat hackers 
Grey-hat hackers Ambiguous Any Varying 
Adversaries of own 
nation-state 
DDoS attacks, 
defacements Patriot hackers Patriotism 
Social engineering, 
backdoors, 
manipulation 
Financial gain, 
revenge, grievance Cyber insiders Employer 
Computer-based 
violence or 
destruction 
Political or social 
change Cyber terrorists Innocent victims 
Vulnerability 
exploits 
Economic gain, ego, 
personal animosity Any Malware authors 
Individuals, small 
companies Social engineering Cyber scammers Financial gain 
Malware for fraud, 
identity theft, DDoS 
for blackmail 
Organized cyber 
criminals 
Individuals, 
companies Financial gain 
Range of 
techniques for 
attack or influence 
operations 
ICT-based systems 
and infrastructures 
(private or public) 
Corporations Financial gain 
Individuals, 
companies, 
governments 
Range of 
techniques to obtain 
information 
Cyber espionage 
agents 
Financial and 
political gain 
Patriotism, 
professional 
development 
Adversaries of own 
nation-state 
Based on the group 
capabilities Cyber militias 
 
Table 2.  Main non-state actors in cyber conflict 
 
During the late 1990s, when access to and use of Internet had become 
commonplace, physical-world conflicts triggered many state-targeted cyber 
actions, primarily conducted by non-state actors. Hackers with nationalistic 
tendencies aimed their cyber actions against foreign countries, commonly in 
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support of their domestic governments, which could be seen at several occasions 
during the Kosovo conflict. For example, a group of Serbian-based patriot 
hackers known as Black Hand (named after the pre-World War I Serbian military 
society) defaced a Kosovo Albanian website and threatened to sabotage military 
computers of NATO countries [18]. Similar hacker groups from China targeted 
various U.S. websites after the Chinese embassy in Belgrade was accidently 
bombed during airstrikes in May 1999 [4]. The Kosovo conflict came to be 
characterized, by some, as the “the first Internet war” [18], although others 
conflicts, such as the Iraq War [27] and the Estonia attacks [44] have later also 
been awarded the same epithet. In the case of the Kosovo conflict, its label as an 
“Internet war” was given in recognition of not only the actual cyber actions, 
which per se do not meet up to the requirements of being actual acts of war, but 
also to reflect the broader role played by the Internet in spreading information 
about the conflict to the general public. 
 
During the first decade of the 21th century, cyberspace itself progressively came 
to be a source of major conflict. The areas of dispute were closely tied to the 
nature of cyberspace and the use, and misuse, and control of information within 
its domain. The conflicts involved disagreement on subjects such as intellectual 
property right and file sharing, the limits of free speech, the balance between 
privacy and security online, and Internet governance and net neutrality [16]. 
Cyberspace can facilitate and accelerate all types of clashes stemming from the 
physical world, from street protests coordinated through social media to full-
scale wars where cyberspace is leveraged to disseminate information to the 
warfighter as well as to the general public in promotion of ones cause. As a target 
of conflict, both the infrastructure of cyberspace, and the resources of its users, 
are exposed the consequences of these conflicts [36]. 
 
Some of the most common cyberspace actors are defined in Table 2 above, 
grouped in categories by motivation, target in focus, employed methods, and 
exploited attack vectors. They are further elaborated on below. 
 
4.1 Ordinary citizens 
 
The most common actor in cyberspace is, quite naturally, the ordinary citizen, 
using the Internet for various lawful purposes, such as browsing the web and 
using online services. In this category one will find home end-users as well as 
employees of companies, organizations or governments, with the common trait 
that their actions and motives are purely individual, and mostly benign. When it 
comes to cyber actions this actor category is mostly passive, or acts indirectly, 
e.g. as a “zombified” victim of a botnet (a collection of Internet-connected 
computers whose security defenses have been breached and control ceded to a 
malicious party), or as a more conscious actor voluntarily letting own resources 
be used by others in a cyber action. 
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4.2 Script kiddies 
 
Script kiddies can be said to be the vandals, or perhaps graffiti artists, of the 
Internet. It is a quite derogative term, commonly used to describe someone with 
an inferior knowledge of programming or security technologies, expressing a 
juvenile or an immature behavior. The competence of the individual script kiddie 
may of course vary, but in general it is the person’s devotion (or rather lack 
thereof) that is defining. A script kiddie does not want to spend a long time to 
fully understand how “hacking” really works, but is rather in it for the quick 
rewards and the bragging rights, motivated by short-term ego-gratification. If 
access to a web server is obtained, a script kiddie will usually seize every 
opportunity to deface its web pages, later showing off the achievement in a 
common Internet Relay Chat (IRC) channel, on Twitter, or a similar social 
forum. 
 
The typical script kiddy searches for existing, frequently well-known and easy to 
find malware, pre-made scripts, or more advanced security auditing and 
penetration testing tools (such as Metasploit [41]) that they can use to identify 
and exploit weaknesses in remote computers, networks or other resources in 
cyberspace. At first glance this actor category might seem relatively harmless, 
but unfortunately they can and will do real damage to any network or computer 
resource they gain access to. The damage is also indiscriminate, often random 
and with little care, or even understanding, of the potentially harmful 
consequences. No difference is made between attacking assets belonging to a 
large government agency or that of a small business owner. 
 
Hackers with hats of all colors (see below) view script kiddies with alarm and 
contempt since they do nothing to advance the “art” of hacking, and sometimes 
incur the wrath of authorities on the entire hacker community. While a hacker 
takes pride in the quality or originality of an attack – commonly leaving no trace 
of an intrusion – a script kiddie may aim at pure quantity, seeing the number of 
successfully compromised servers, Trojanized clients, or stolen credit cards as a 
way to obtain attention and notoriety. Script kiddies are sometimes portrayed in 
media as bored, lonely teenagers seeking recognition from their peers. 
 
4.3 Hacktivists 
 
Hacktivism is the use of cyberspace resources, in legal or (perhaps more 
commonly) illegal ways, as a means of general protest or to promote an 
expressed ideology or a political agenda. Hacktivism can also, indirectly, be used 
as a method to reach underlying, hidden political, military or commercial goals. 
Tools used by hacktivists include web site defacements, internet resource 
redirects, denial-of-service attacks, information theft, web site parodies, virtual 
sit-ins and various forms of cyber- sabotage. Hacktivists can, in some sense, be 
seen as a cyberspace equivalent to Greenpeace activists or other groups carrying 
out acts civil disobedience. 
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The loosely associated “Anonymous” collective is many times seen as an 
archetype of a hacktivist actor [46]. It consists of a mixed group of people, 
ranging from script kiddies to professional black hats (see below), connected 
through a variety of non-mainstream social networking services such as the 
anonymous “4chan” and “711chan” forums, the “Encyclopaedia Dramatica” wiki 
and specific chat channels in the IRC network [8]. They have taken responsibility 
for several significant, widely publicized cyber actions in recent years, gaining 
them widespread attention [39]. These attacks include the “war” on Scientology, 
various support actions during the Arab Spring, and attacks on companies such 
as Louis Vuitton, Sony, Mastercard and U.S. government websites. 
 
Although hacktivists are generally thought to be ethically motivated, their 
activities span many political ideals and issues. Hacktivist collectives have 
sometimes been described as a flock of birds, where at any given moment more 
birds can join, leave, or peel off in another direction entirely. Individual members 
of a hacktivist collective can thus have varying loyalties, and simultaneously be 
part of other actor formations. 
 
4.4 Hackers 
 
Hackers are people with deep knowledge and thorough understanding of 
computer technology, and how computer hardware, software and networking 
interact. They are commonly concerned with subtle details of operating systems, 
algorithms and system configurations. Hackers are generally thought of as an 
elite collective of well-trained and highly ambitious people, spending large parts 
of their lives in front of computer monitors. 
 
The stereotypic hacker, as portrayed in movies and through popular culture, is a 
young “nerdy” male, dressed in black clothes, an enthusiastic fan of the science 
fiction genre, lacking general social skills and preferring fast food and high-
caffeine content soft drinks. Although this might once have held some measure 
of truth, the concept of a hacker has expanded greatly and includes wide ranges 
of people, including self-taught computer specialists, computer science college 
students and security professionals of many occupations. These hackers may be 
motivated by a multitude of incentives, such as curiosity, economic gain, 
political agendas, attraction to technical challenge, or pure boredom. Although 
the term “hacking” has broadly come to denote any type of illegal computer-
related activities, the original term only described a general technical aptitude, 
whereas the epithet “cracker” was given to hackers with a malicious intent. [38] 
However, contemporary categorizing of hackers by intent and motivation is 
usually done by “hat color”. Depending on their motives, hackers are sub-
categorized into black-hat hackers, white-hat hackers, and grey-hat hackers. 
 
Black-hat hackers are the malevolent types of hackers originally dubbed 
“crackers”. They are people who exploit computer systems and networks for 
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their own benefit. For example, they may hack into an online store’s computer 
system and steal stored credit card numbers. They may then use the stolen 
information to purchase merchandise, technical equipment or sell the credit card 
numbers to a third party. Black-hat hackers are commonly viewed as the most 
malign actors in the hacker sphere, acting without respect for the law or the result 
that their actions may result in for their victims. 
 
White-hat hackers, or “ethical hackers”, are hackers who have high moral 
standards, relative to common societal norms. They specialize in penetration 
testing and validation methodologies in order to ensure the security of an 
organization’s information systems, and are commonly employed by government 
agencies or by companies specializing in information security consulting. White-
hats commonly alert and advise software vendors of the vulnerabilities that they 
discover, so that they may be patched. This approach stands in contrast to that of 
black-hat hackers, who usually keep their findings to themselves, in order to 
develop exploits targeting the specific, unknown vulnerability (also called zero-
day attacks). 
 
Gray-hat hackers are hackers who conform to white-hat standards most of the 
time, but who may also wear a metaphoric black hat once in a while. For 
example, if their interests are targeted by an attack, they might opt to take the 
matter into their own hands, rather than to report the incident to proper law-
enforcing agencies. Grey-hats may also either consciously or inadvertently 
violate the law in an effort to study or improve system design and security. 
 
4.5 Patriot hackers 
 
Patriot hackers are hackers whose main motives are to aid or support one’s own 
nation-state in an ongoing real-world conflict or war, by carrying out various 
disruptive actions in cyberspace directed towards the enemy of the state. Chinese 
hackers have traditionally been especially inclined toward patriotic hacking [30]. 
Known as the “Red Hacker Alliance” or the “Honker Union of China”, they have 
published an open manifesto, expressing their patriotic mission [1]. Several cyber 
actions undertaken by these groups have been two-way “hacker wars” between 
the Chinese-based hackers and their antagonists in other countries. 
 
Russia has also been home to an active patriot hacker collective. This became 
evident during the 2007 denial-of-service attacks targeting Estonia [19], in the 
wake of the Soviet-era war memorial relocation controversy, and again in 2008, 
when Georgia was the target of similar attacks in conjunction with a 
conventional military confrontation with Russian forces [48]. Russian patriot 
hackers were also implicated for several web defacements during the 1999 
Kosovo conflict, such as those previously mentioned above, and for various 
cyber actions against Israel, Chechnya, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and others during 
the past decade [31]. 
 
59 
 
4.6 Cyber insiders 
 
Cyber insiders are actors who have legitimate access to computer and network 
resources, including information residing in associated systems, but who are 
disloyal to their employer, hiring party or constituent, and are willing to betray 
them for monetary benefits or other reasons. The cyber insider may plant logical 
bombs or open backdoors in programs they help develop, or steal sensitive data 
by use of small, portable and easily concealed storage devices. They may act as 
script kiddies in the sense that they attack internal resources to provoke a reaction 
from the employer, to enact personal vendettas, or as a cyber-espionage agent to 
collect and publicly disclose classified information or to sell corporate secrets to 
a competitor or foreign intelligence agency. Studies have shown that although the 
proportion of security incidents related to cyber insiders have decreased, the 
financial impact and operating losses due to insider intrusions are increasing 
[25]. 
 
The cyber insider threat  is unlike other vulnerability based attacks in that the 
action taken by the initiator is not based on unauthorized access, but rather by 
authorized access by authorized objects (people or system processes), within the 
organizations security boundary. Any illicit actions instigated by a cyber insider 
will thus not be perceived as anomalous by intrusion detection systems, logging 
or expert systems, making them highly difficult to mitigate. The U.S. Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) has an ongoing project called 
CINDER (an abbreviation for “The Cyber Insider Threat”) [59]. This project 
aims to combat such insider-induced intelligence leaks as the so-called “Afghan 
War documents” and the diplomatic cables of “Cablegate”, which were publicly 
disclosed to media outlets by Julian Assange and Wikileaks [24]. 
 
4.7 Cyber terrorists 
 
Terrorists are extremists who do not hesitate to make use of extreme means, such 
as brutal violence towards the innocent or mass destruction of public property, in 
pursuit of their political goals or ideological agendas. Cyber terrorists are 
terrorists who use computer and network technologies to carry out their attacks 
and cause public fear. Cyber terrorism has been a much debated topic during the 
last few years. It has also been a rather emotionally charged subject, in which 
expert opinions on the realism of the threat have been divided. Some experts 
claim that cyber terror is one of our times most potential and alarming dangers 
[58][6], whereas others mean that the fear of cyber terrorism has been greatly 
exaggerated and is largely blown out of proportion [52][68], perhaps at the 
expense of more plausible and possible cyber problems [23]. 
 
There have not yet been any reported cases of cyber terror attacks, and it has 
been argued that cyber terrorism does not exist [34]. In reports that have been 
published on cyber terrorism, the so-called terrorists are regularly “ordinary” 
hackers, or other actors, mistaken for terrorists [68]. However, if terrorists would 
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manage to conduct such attacks in cyberspace, the consequences might be 
significant and thus cannot completely be ignored. After the 9/11 terror attacks in 
the United States, it became apparent that the country was quite ill-prepared for 
preventing those types of events. Later investigations showed that part of the 
responsibility for this inability could be attributed to “the stovepiping of 
intelligence that allowed the attack to go unmitigated.” [2] This was subsequently 
addressed by enacting new laws and empowering certain authorities to allow for 
harsher monitoring and surveillance, so that greater amounts of information 
could be collected to feed the various intelligence agencies. 
 
4.8 Malware authors 
 
Malware authors can be seen as a form of specialized black-hat hackers, who 
develop original software for antagonistic or criminal purposes. They are usually 
relatively highly skilled in computer programming and especially knowledgeable 
of methods to evade detection by common antivirus, anti-spyware and spam-
filtering software. There are, however, less sophisticated malware authors, who 
utilize readily available malware “creation kits”. These frameworks allow for the 
creating of customized malware by choosing from a set of available delivery 
methods, payloads and means of propagation [51]. Creators of malware using 
such means are usually grouped into the same category as script kiddies, as 
utilizing these tools does not require any specific programming skills.  
 
4.9 Cyber scammers 
 
Scammers are usually considered to be the least skilled actors in cyberspace. The 
ordinary cyber scammers are similar to the real-world, analog counterparts, but 
instead employ information technology to defraud their victims. These scammers 
commonly make use of random spamming, trying to get the attention of victims 
by advertising fake lottery winnings, a recently discovered large inheritance, or a 
job offering with an unreasonably high salary, while masquerading as a 
trustworthy entity. This approach is sometimes called “phishing”, a term 
influenced by the related term “phreaking”, a portmanteau of the words phone 
and freak. Phishing refers to the use of tempting “baits”, in hopes that the 
potential victim will be tempted to “bite”, and thus fall for the scam. The motives 
of cyber scammers are almost universally pure economic gain, by deceiving the 
ones who respond to the scams into disclosing credit card details or other 
valuable information. However, there are more sophisticated and subtle 
scammers who target their victims carefully, perhaps after analyzing lists of 
stolen bank statements, open source intelligence gathering of personally 
identifiable information. This type if scam, sometimes called “spear phishing”, 
includes the use of advanced social engineering schemes to separate the victims 
with from whatever items of value that they may have. 
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4.10 Organized cyber criminals 
 
Organized crime in cyberspace can, in some sense, be seen as the analog of its 
counterpart in the real world. However, the borderless and anonymous nature of 
cyberspace allows otherwise unassociated individuals in different parts of the 
world to connect and form criminal networks sharing a common goal or interest 
[63]. Some further, significant differences between cybercrime and its real-world 
equivalent include the immature status of cyber law enforcement, the low 
thresholds for entry into “market”, and the easy access to large groups of 
potential targets. These factors all contribute to facilitate the work of organized 
cybercrime syndicates. 
 
Many of the activities defined in this paper as cyber actions are deemed illegal by 
national legislation as well as international treaties, including the previously 
mentioned phenomenons hacking, scamming and executing denial-of-service 
attacks. There are, however, also many other types of problematic crimes 
committed in cyberspace, such as identity theft, harassment, extortion, child 
pornography and human trafficking. Of all these criminal activities that occur in 
cyberspace, some 80 percent are estimated to originate in some form of 
organized activity [40]. These groups tend to be quite small, commonly 
consisting of less than a dozen people, are more loosely structured than groups 
involved in other forms of organized crime, and include members that are older 
and less tech-savvy than commonly believed [40][63]. 
 
Although cybercrime may be committed from any part of the world, certain 
regions have been implicated as particularly active cybercrime hubs, including 
Eastern Europe and West Africa [63]. Organized cyber criminals are usually 
motivated by money and power, i.e. significant economic return on invested 
resources, and acquiring control of the market. However, another explanation for 
regions such as the above mentioned having a high degree of organized 
cybercrime could be that in areas where unemployment rates are high and 
salaries are low, previously lawful citizens with sufficient technical skills turn to 
organized cybercrime as a way of leveraging oneself out of poverty [28][9]. 
Since cybercrime in many cases has shown to be highly lucrative, and most 
developing countries are not actively or efficiently sanctioning these actions, 
cybercrime is seen as a viable, and sometimes even commended, career path. 
 
Organized cybercriminals, as in other organized crime generating large revenues, 
may many times have the potential to be on even footing with even the strongest 
enemy, such as law enforcement agencies and nation states when it comes to 
available resources. The profits are in some cases truly immense. According to a 
study made by the security company Sophos, cybercriminals in Brazil managed 
to steal $900 million during 2010 [57]. When considering the cost of cybercrime 
on a global scale, the anti-virus software company Symantec has estimated it at 
staggering $114 billion. It is thus “significantly more than the annual global 
market for marijuana, cocaine and heroin combined [53].” 
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4.11 Corporations 
 
Corporations acting in cyberspace are usually thought to be law-abiding entities, 
as serious transgressions may lead to sizeable economic sanctions or even 
personal accountability for key officials within the organization. This fact is 
normally what separates the corporation from an organized crime syndicate, 
since they both share the motives of economic profit and market control. 
Corporations carrying out acts in cyber warfare are thus usually doing so at the 
request of a nation-state, either by being on a government contract or by more 
autonomous actions under the government’s blessing [21]. Intelligence agencies 
may also use corporate fronts as a cover for cyber espionage operations [2]. 
Large international corporations doing business in many different countries may 
find themselves in a precarious situation during a cyber conflict, finding 
themselves on both sides of the front line. An example of this is Google’s 
Chinese subsidiary, which in 2010 was permanently moved from Mainland 
China to Hong Kong, after Chinese-originated cyber-attacks against Google and 
other U.S. corporations was discovered [22]. 
 
4.12 Cyber espionage agents 
 
The concepts of intelligence and espionage are closely related. While intelligence 
gathering in general is not considered to be illegal, the subset of actions that fall 
within espionage is commonly deemed to be crimes under the legal code of many 
nations. Espionage involves obtaining classified or sensitive information without 
the permission of the holder of the information, and can be committed by an 
agent in employ by military forces of a certain country, a government institution, 
a commercial corporation, a criminal organization or by an individual acting 
autonomously [33].  
 
In cyber espionage, agents make use of cyberspace resources for intelligence 
collection. They intercept information that passes through, or resides in, 
computer networks or computer systems of special interest, by using cracking 
and infiltration techniques, software and hardware tools for surveillance, or other 
similar approaches. The gathered data is analyzed and utilized in the preparation 
of intelligence reports for the commissioning entity. Cyber espionage may also 
entail the collection and analysis of open source information, publicly available 
on Internet web pages or via social media networks such as Facebook, Twitter, 
blogs, discussion boards and forums. 
 
Whether the purpose of the cyber espionage is military, political or economic, a 
distinction that can be made between cyber espionage agents and other actors, 
such as cyber criminals, is that the former act lawfully or with the tacit approval 
of a sponsoring nation-state, at least in relation to the laws of that state. In some 
views, cyber espionage is regarded as a necessary part of global economic 
competition, and monitoring of cyber capabilities of adversaries is considered to 
be essential to national security [70]. Although cyber espionage agents are 
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commonly associated with national intelligence agencies, military units or 
similar organizations tied to nation-states, cyber espionage agents can also act 
autonomously, as rogue entities. 
 
The National Security Agency (NSA) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
are two of the largest intelligence organizations within the United States 
government. Besides having a large number of intelligence analysts, these 
organizations frequently employ prominent mathematicians and computer 
scientists to study encryption algorithms and to develop cryptanalysis tools. This 
sort of work has significantly helped to win battles and to end wars, and is thus 
considered to be of very high importance to national security and the armed 
forces [66]. In 2010 the United States Cyber Command, co-located with the 
NSA, gained operational capability. The command’s main purpose is to organize 
and coordinate the U.S. cyber resources, and to ensure U.S. and allied freedom of 
action in cyberspace and deny the same to its adversaries. Similar military 
organizations are being established in many countries, as cyberspace is 
increasingly being recognized as an important arena for military operations. 
Cyber espionage agents are thus a key asset which is essential in maintaining 
information dominance. 
 
4.13 Cyber militias 
 
A cyber militia may be defined as a group of volunteers who are willing and able 
to use cyber attacks (or perhaps disruptive cyber actions as defined in this paper) 
in order to achieve a political goal [48]. They utilize a common communications 
channel, such as an Internet forum or a social media service, and take measures 
to hide their true identities. Furthermore, it is understood that members of a cyber 
militia do not get any monetary rewards for their services, nor are they bound by 
any contractual obligation [48]. Regular military cyber-units, or a national cyber 
reserve forces, are in this context not considered to be cyber militia, although 
they could consist of “cyber mercenaries”, actors who take part of military 
actions in cyberspace essentially by the desire for private gain, or people who are 
part of a cyber militia in their spare time. The members of a cyber militia are 
either loosely connected in real life, or completely lack away-from-keyboard 
relations to one another. 
 
The involvement of civilians in recent cyber-conflicts has created a sizeable gray 
area between hacktivists, political hackers and legitimate combatants backed by 
nation-states. The debate has been fierce concerning if these people are 
individual and independent actors, motivated by political or nationalistic goals, 
or participants in covert government-orchestrated campaigns with the purpose to 
further the strategic political or military objective of the instigating state [3]. 
Most cases of politically motivated cyber actions that have occurred during 
recent years have been attributed to unidentified radical hackers, or hacktivists. 
Such actions have ranged from mere annoyances, e.g. the defacement of websites 
in Japan in reaction to new anti-piracy legislation [50], to full-scale digital 
64 
 
blockades of the target country. In cases such as the attacks on Estonian 
cyberspace resources in 2007, an intense debate continues as to whether the 
attacks were instigated by a nation-state, if they were the work of independent 
patriot hackers defending their country’s honor, or if an organized cyber militia 
was responsible [49][3]. 
 
As cyber attacks can be launched by proxy, using trojanized unsuspecting end-
users’ computers, proving whether nation-states are engaging in cyber warfare is 
naturally difficult. Cyber-militias have been suspected of performing several 
recent high-profile cyber actions that were, at least in part, sanctioned by nation-
states. The list of nations engaging in political hacking includes Iran, Turkey, 
Israel, and North and South Korea [3]. Two examples of nations involved in 
these types of attacks are the People’s Republic of China and the Russian 
Federation. Both of these countries are rapidly building cyber warfare 
capabilities, and have developed large bodies of doctrine and technology in 
support of this new concept [12]. 
 
 
5. Employing Non-state Actors in Cyberspace Operations 
 
As cyberspace, unlike other arenas associated with warfare, provides a high level 
of anonymity, attackers can carry out actions in this domain with little or no risk 
of attribution. Nation-states thus have little or no incentive to support a legally 
binding definition of cyber war, which would limit their freedom of action, or to 
formally take responsibility for executed cyber attacks. Furthermore, cyber 
attacks can be carried out inexpensively, and can, at least in theory, cause 
extensive damage or at least trigger severe disruptions to ICT-based services. In 
addition, if a nation-state can covertly initiate, fund, or control such attacks, 
relying on non-state actors to carry out the attacks in their stead, they can reduce 
the already low risk of political implications, and potentially achieve their 
objectives without the burden of adhering to the Law of Armed Conflict. This 
gives an attacker a tremendous asymmetric advantage, especially for smaller 
nations that cannot prevail on a kinetic battlefield. As a result, employment of 
non-state actors in cyberspace operations is likely a very attractive option for 
nation-states or an equivalent body, especially when pursuing limited strategic 
goals. 
 
Some of the main “pros and cons” of engaging in cyber warfare, and employing 
non-state actors in the associated cyberspace operations, has been summarized in 
Table 3 above. The benefits and drawbacks are also further explained and 
motivated below. 
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Benefits Drawbacks 
Gaining the initiative – element of surprise No direct control of non-state actors 
Plausible deniability Risk of unintended collateral damage 
Can choose target and attack vector Targeting of own resources 
Determinate scale and duration of attack Escalation to conventional war 
Exploit legal uncertainties Labeling as sponsor of terrorism 
Possibility of rapid attacking-by-proxy Backlashes (blackmailing etc.) 
 
Table 3.  Benefits and drawbacks of using non-state actors in 
cyberspace operations 
 
 
5.1 Benefits 
 
The attacker gains the initiative and can most often conduct cyber attacks 
covertly, offering the advantage of surprise as well as the benefit of plausible 
deniability. By being the one who initiates the attack, the defender is forced to 
respond, often in a predictable way. 
 
The attacker can launch the cyber attack at the exact time, and against the target, 
of their own choosing, using appropriate attack methods. The attacker may need 
only a single computer to conduct an attack, whereas the defender must 
efficiently shield all its cyber-resources, which can be prohibitively expensive. 
 
The attacker can decide the attack mode, scale and duration in order to cause 
desired effects. Besides conducting the attacks themselves, they can enlist allies, 
magnifying both the scale of the attack, and the effects of plausible deniability. 
 
Even if attribution is successful, i.e. the attacker is identified by the defender, the 
lack of applicable international laws covering cyber warfare creates a useful 
shield of legal ambiguity. 
 
The attacker can outsource cyber attacks to cyber militias, organized cyber 
criminals, or mercenary hackers. Although employing non-state actors in this 
manner might raise suspicion in the international community, the lack of any 
hard evidence will protect the attacker political ramifications. Thus, the threat of 
a counterstrike is negligible. 
 
By recruiting non-state actors from previously identified Internet forums and 
social networks, rapid mobilization of a considerable, suitably motivated, and 
technically competent force can be achieved at little or no cost. 
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5.2 Drawbacks 
 
Although the attacker may give directives as to what targets and methods that 
should be in focus during a cyber attack, the actual control of non-state actors in 
cyberspace operations can be ineffective, as unacceptable behavior is hard to 
curb, and ongoing attacks difficult to thwart. 
 
The attacker risks creating unwanted collateral damage, by hitting unintended 
targets. Attacks could also grow beyond the intended size and scope. Overly 
zealous members of cyber militias, not limited by the restrictions that govern 
military organizations, could opt to target civilian targets without thought of 
possible consequences. 
 
Attacks initiated by non-state actors could affect the attackers network or 
resources negatively, by overloading common infrastructures, such as Internet 
backbone connections. 
 
Even though the laws of war are unclear concerning cyberspace, attacks that are 
linked back to the initiating nation-state could be politically devastating.  
Escalation may also lead to retaliation through conventional means [35]. 
 
If cyber attacks are directed against civilian systems, as is most likely in one way 
or another, the initiating state could be accused of committing war crimes, or 
being branded as a sponsor of cyber terrorism, becoming pariah as far as 
international relations are concerned. 
 
Employing non-state actors can potentially be risky in the long term, even though 
the immediate attacks are successful, as these might be unreliable. Criminals 
might try to blackmail a government in order not to disclose sensitive details, and 
contracted cyber espionage agents might defect to the opposing nation if offered 
political asylum. 
 
5.3 Legal issues 
 
The legal issues surrounding cyber warfare are vast, especially when it comes to 
the frameworks that currently govern state-to-state warfare. Although the main 
focus of this paper is not to study the quirks and twists of international law in any 
great detail, it is still relevant to acknowledge the current uncertainties in existing 
legislation and international conventions, and to observe how this uncertainty 
affects the employment of non-state actors in state-sponsored cyber conflict.  
 
The use of cyber attacks would likely violate, if not the direct tenets, at least the 
spirit of the Law of Armed Conflict [67]. That is assuming that such laws are at 
all applicable to cyber warfare. Even other, less destructive cyber actions, could 
probably constitute acts of war according to the UN Charter [55], and 
consequently allow legitimate use of force in self-defense. However, as 
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previously established, if the actions do not include violence, or the threat of 
violence, they cannot be defined as cyber attacks. Because of the prevailing 
uncertainty regarding cyberspace as a battlefield, it is probably in many nation-
states’ interest to keep such laws from becoming applicable to cyber warfare. The 
reason is that it would be likely be impossible to carry out cyber attacks while 
remaining within the legal framework. Nevertheless, should new conventions on 
cyber warfare be universally ratified, covertly outsourcing cyber attacks to cyber-
militias could be a viable option. In any case, the current ambiguity in 
international law strongly favors the attacker, and does not seem to offer any 
resort to cyber attack victims. 
 
Another relevant question is if an individual who conducts a cyber attack legally 
can be considered to be a combatant? According to the Third Geneva Convention 
there are two types of combatants – privileged and unprivileged [20]. Privileged 
combatants are members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict who (i) are 
being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates, (ii) have a fixed, 
distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, (iii) carry arms openly, and (iv) 
conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war. Most 
non-state actors, including hackers, criminals, and terrorists clearly do not fall 
within the constraints of this definition. It could be argued that state-sponsored 
cyber-militias, patriot hackers or cyber espionage agents are being commanded 
by a person responsible for subordinates. However, it is quite obvious that they 
do not wear a fixed, distinctive sign or carry arms openly. Furthermore, many of 
their actions could be interpreted as being in direct violation of the laws and 
customs of war. 
 
In addition, even members of regular military cyber forces might fail to meet the 
requirements of the Geneva Convention. Although they are afforded privileged 
combatant status when engaged in conventional hostilities, conducting cyber 
attacks could potentially deprive them of that status. While members of regular 
armed forces might be wearing uniforms when conducting a cyber attack, the 
victims of their attack will not be able see it. Carrying arms openly is also quite 
unlikely as most cyber attacks are, if at all detectable, virtually impossible to 
track to their original source. Combatants who engage in actions that violate the 
laws of war, such as deliberately targeting civilian resources, automatically lose 
that privileged combatant status. At least in theory, this precludes using 
commercial infrastructure for delivery of cyber attacks. Whereas privileged 
combatants are entitled to treatment as a prisoner of war, unprivileged 
combatants might be subject to punishment under the civilian laws of the 
detaining power. 
 
As the risk of capture is very unlikely in cyber warfare, incentives for attackers to 
adhere to the laws of war in order to gain privileged combatant status must be 
assumed to be fairly weak. Especially since the victims are oblivious to the 
combatant status of the one who instigated the attack. This is somewhat similar 
to other weapons that provide great standoff distances, such as intercontinental 
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ballistic missiles (ICBM) or unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) drones. However, 
those weapons usually leave quite obvious evidence of the attacks originating 
nation, while the anonymity that cyber weapons afford attackers is almost 
absolute. 
 
Even if an indisputable connection is established between a non-state proxy and a 
nation-state, such a connection does not legally grant the attacking individuals 
combatant status. As an example, in the cyber-conflict between Russia and 
Georgia of August 2008, plausible evidence linked the “StopGeorgia.ru” website, 
where attack instructions against Georgian government systems were given, to 
the Kremlin by way of Russian intelligence services (GRU) and the national 
youth association “Nashi” [12]. It can thus be argued that the Russian 
government-commissioned “non-state” hacktivists to accomplish its objectives. 
Even though the individual hacktivists may have been enjoying backing from a 
nation-state, they cannot legally be considered to be combatants, but rather as 
cybercriminals, albeit somewhat doubtfully so. 
 
All in all, the Russian government’s employment of non-state actors in the cyber 
conflict with Georgia demonstrated a usable model for conducting limited-scope 
cyber attacks. By use of patriot hackers or cyber militias, recruited through 
informal channels appealing to nationalistic zeal, the instigating nation-state 
could escape recrimination while simultaneously, at least partially, reaching its 
strategic objectives. 
 
 
6. Discussion 
 
The artificial nature of the cyber environment is one of the fundamental 
differences between cyber warfare and kinetic warfare. Conventional warfare is 
carried out in the physical world, governed by the familiar laws of physics that 
we know and understand with respect to warfare. Cyber warfare, on the other 
hand, takes place in an artificial world, created by humans, in a state of constant 
change. While some principles of kinetic warfare can be employed in cyber 
warfare, others have minor or no meaning in cyberspace. Some concrete 
examples are the concepts of distance, time and targeting, which are essential in 
the planning and execution of conventional warfare. The principles of cyber 
warfare are thus fundamentally different from those of kinetic warfare. This fact 
highlights the need for a new military approach when considering cyber war, 
including the development of strategy, tactics, tools and specializations to suit 
the needs of future operations in cyberspace. 
 
The true nature of cyber warfare, cyber conflict, and the actors engaging in these 
activities, has unfortunately been heavily obscured by the frequent use of vague 
terminology in media and contemporary literature, the employment of 
sensationalist rhetoric by politicians and corporate proponents, a lack of solid 
empirical datasets, and a lingering notion that these new concepts are unique in 
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their characteristics, rather than constituting yet another set of new and improved 
technologies applied to the art of war. The goal of this paper has been to study 
the various non-state actors who coexist in cyberspace and their employment by 
nation-states in cyberspace operations. The distinctions between these actors may 
perhaps appear somewhat artificial. Boundaries between, for example, script 
kiddies, hacktivists and patriot hackers, or between cybercriminals and cyber 
espionage agents, may admittingly be somewhat blurry. Similarly, individual 
actors can of course participate in multiple activities. However, the distinctions 
between the actors are useful for analytical purposes. 
 
As we have seen, the threat of an imminent all-out cyber war is not very likely. 
The prospect of bringing warfare to the cyber arena does nevertheless promise 
significant asymmetric advantages to a limited resource nation-state, especially if 
the attacker can remain anonymous. Moreover, if the instigating nation covertly 
employs cyber militias and hacktivists to carry out cyber attacks, this will 
provide an efficient shield against subsequent blame and political ramifications, 
while simultaneously allowing strategic political objectives to be achieved. If 
traced to the source, such attacks will legally be seen as criminal activity, 
possibly even in the unlikely scenario where comprehensive and irrefutable 
evidence can be provided, linking the nation-state and the attacker, as blame can 
always be passed around. 
 
Nation-states have little incentive to openly take credit for cyber attacks. Doing 
so could lead to political or military recrimination, and might expose individuals 
to criminal prosecution if their responsibility for committed illicit actions was 
deemed to be against the laws and customs of war. While some nation-states 
might favor ratifying a novel legal framework defining acts of aggression in 
cyberspace, it seems likely that many others would find it far more beneficial to 
maintain the current ambiguity that surrounds cyber warfare, and perhaps even 
actively undermine such efforts, as the asymmetric nature of cyber warfare 
benefits those who lack the ability to dominate in conventional arenas. Even if 
the international community were successful in codifying cyber warfare into 
alignment with international law, and thereby implement limitations of its use, it 
would probably still not be very effective as the employment of non-state actors 
in cyberspace operations is still in effect a gray area. 
 
Due to these asymmetric advantages that may be leveraged in cyberspace, this 
arena will likely grow in importance over the coming decades as the Internet 
becomes even more pervasive throughout developing countries of Asia and 
Africa, and the critical infrastructures of these countries evolve. Politically 
motivated cyber actions will likely escalate in both frequency and scale, and 
attribution for these acts is likely to remain infeasible because of the anonymity 
the Internet provides. As the number of global Internet users grows, problematic 
cyber actions related to such actors as cyber scammers and script kiddies are also 
like likely to increase. The fact that there are quite a lot of people in this 
category, namely those interested or curious about exploiting cyberspace 
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resources for private gain, in combination with the amount of readily available 
tools for security vulnerability exploitation, and the generally low awareness of 
how to establish adequate information security in society, makes these users 
more than a nuisance. 
 
An interesting question is what it would take for the nation-states that currently 
dominate use and development of cyberspace to intervene in reaction to this 
trend. Whereas attacks such as those previously mentioned, directed at Estonia 
and Georgia, have primarily resulted in discussion, it is conceivable that an 
extensive and damaging attack conducted against a nation-state, such as a cyber 
terror attack, could motivate the international community to create a legal 
framework to address this issue, or incite a rapid technical development that 
would limit or prevent future attacks. 
 
Given that the response to an extensive cyber terror attack would follow the same 
reaction logics as a conventional terror attack, it is fair to assume that the 
response would also be of a similar nature, resulting in an overall heightened 
security posture, and possibly also retaliation against those thought to be 
responsible or in plausible support of the attacks. We might also begin to see the 
erection of virtual walls, formation of controlled cyber borders and stricter 
logical or physical separations of cyberspace domains. If the cyber terror attack 
was serious enough we might even see the end of the Internet as we know it 
today, and the creation of a replacement with a more rigorous and fundamental 
security design. One such proposed scenario is “cyber-balkanization” [29], 
referring to the splintering of the Internet into subnets for specific functions such 
as critical infrastructure management or internal government communications. 
While that scenario is fiercely opposed by the advocates of “net neutrality” [69], 
others call for the creation of a new secure Internet infrastructure to reduce the 
threat of cyber attacks [56]. If this theoretical development would be for the 
better or worse can thus surely be debated at lengths. 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Although cyberspace conflicts are predominately a non-state activity, they are 
drawing the attention of those who wish to leverage them to promote their own 
purposes. Cyber conflicts can be seen as a mirror of their real-world counterparts, 
but also increasingly as completely independent disputes, clashes, attacks and 
perhaps acts of war in an emerging arena. In most cases, as we have seen, cyber 
actions involve various non-state actors. However, the overlapping gray-zone 
between these actor categories and legitimate state-backed cyber warriors are a 
source of concern since no legal definition of cyber warfare, or agreement on 
what constitutes an “act or war” in cyberspace, currently exists. It also seems 
unlikely that such conventions will be forthcoming in the immediate future, 
creating a window of opportunity for resource-limited actors who cannot prevail 
on a kinetic battlefield. 
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The covert or overt employment of non-state actors in cyberspace operations, as 
volunteers in state-to-state conflicts, cyber militias, cyber-mercenaries or 
organized cyber-criminals raises many new questions, and is an interesting trend 
which deserves further study. Although there have not yet been any concrete 
instances where cyber actions, or cyber attacks, have resulted in physical injury 
or extended destruction of property, the heavy cyber-dependency of modern 
western countries makes more damaging cyber attacks plausible or even probable 
in future scenarios. Finding ways to mitigate these types of hazardous events, 
before they evolve into real threats to national security, are thus an increasingly 
pressing issue for academia, as well as practitioners, involved in the study of 
cyber defense. 
 
As the ongoing “War on Terror” is slowly coming to an end, focus increasingly 
seems to be shifting towards the cyber arena. Terrorism as a phenomenon is most 
certainly not eradicated, in Afghanistan or elsewhere, and as next-generation 
will-be cyber terrorists are growing up with computers and smartphones, the 
advent of cyber attacks of magnitudes greater than those previously witnessed, 
could be approaching. In the other corner, the global defense industry is likely 
picking up the scent of significant military spending coming their way. This 
makes for an interesting, if perhaps somewhat disquieting development in the 
coming years, where one could probably only hope for a balanced and sensible 
approach from all involved actors. 
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Abstract 
 
The Stuxnet worm changed the picture of cyber war from abstract to concrete in 
an undeniable way. This paper studies the implications of recent discovery of 
Stuxnet and other self-replicating cyber weapons. We describe the state of art in 
known cyber weaponry and extrapolate the requirements and attributes for 
potential weapons. From this understanding of the weapons we discuss some 
aspects of future cyber doctrine. 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
This paper studies the structure and use of cyber weapons that are targeted 
against the critical infrastructure of a modern society. Digitalization of the 
infrastructure has provided a large number of vulnerabilities and by analyzing 
and understanding them we can envision potential cyber weapons to use against 
these vulnerabilities. Understanding the behavior and capabilities of these 
weapons enables us to design defense against them. 
 
Cyber war itself is a new concept that is still looking for its meaning. We think 
that a recognized war between nations, which is fought only over computer 
networks is not a likely occurrence in near future. More likely is that cyber 
operations will be used during conventional war, where they form one supporting 
theater, similar in concept to air war. And, as one of the characteristics of cyber 
weapons is deniability, clandestine cyber operations will take place but as the 
perpetrator is not known, a war will not be declared. 
 
No commonly agreed definition of cyber security exists yet; for this paper we 
define “cyber security” as security of all kinds of digital systems and “cyber 
weapons” as computer based capabilities against digital systems. The purpose of 
the first definition is to emphasize that our digital infrastructure includes devices 
that are not commonly viewed as “computers”, such as the power grid, traffic 
lights and cars. The second definition emphasizes the nature of cyber weapons as 
a collection of tools and modules rather than individual pieces of software or 
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hardware. We also think that “cyber war” could be defined as operations against 
a nation’s digital systems, which threaten its national and economic security. 
 
 
2.  Critical Digital Infrastructure 
 
The digital systems on which the modern society is based have been built with 
reliability and industrial safety in mind. Threat of an intentional adversary has 
usually not been included in planning and, when realized, has usually been 
countered by isolating these systems to their own networks. 
 
Those parts of the infrastructure that are vital to the workings of a nation can be 
considered the critical infrastructure and with the digitalization of these systems 
part of this infrastructure is the critical digital infrastructure. When computers 
and digital automation are used to control systems, their actions are fast and 
invisible, unlike a human controller’s. Many parts of the modern infrastructure 
are also very complex. This leaves an opening for an attacker that wishes to harm 
the society. Conventional attacks require human presence at the system one 
wishes to influence; digital attacks can be performed over networks or by 
autonomous software without physical presence. 
 
The lack of need to be present is what distinguishes cyber warfare mostly from 
conventional warfare. Computer networks, like the Internet are in effect almost 
“zero-dimensional”, any point in the network can be reached from any other 
point and the effort is not dependent on the distance between the points.  
 
The purpose of a nation’s military forces is usually to protect the existence of the 
nation and its people. As the vulnerabilities created by the digitalization of the 
infrastructure become more clear, the demands for the military grow. How the 
need to protect the infrastructure affects the mission of the military will be an 
interesting question that needs to be answered in many countries in the near 
future. 
 
2.1 Automation systems in critical infrastructure 
 
Industrial automation has progressed steadily from fixed, mechanical automation 
via more flexible digital automation to centrally controlled systems. For example 
the water supply for a city could be run from a reservoir to water towers and to 
residential areas and be controlled with mechanical valves that are controlled by 
floats and levers that sense water levels. The water towers guarantee a sufficient 
water pressure to the homes, but a large amount of water is stored in the system, 
getting stale and possibly polluted by bacteria. Replacing the towers with pumps 
and smart controllers lessens the amount of water in system, increasing quality 
and offering better overall control, but removes the automatic redundancy from 
the system and makes it more vulnerable to loss of control. 
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A town’s water supply is a relatively simple control process, with basically one 
product flowing in one direction with little processing. Many critical systems are 
more complex and require much more control. For example the processes 
required to turn raw oil to fuels, lubricants and various chemicals for other 
industries are complex. Centralized control helps in tuning these processes to be 
very efficient, enabling a continuous flow of materials and lowering the cost of 
process, but the removal of intermediate storage and fine tuning of various steps 
have created a process that can not be controlled manually any longer. A modern 
chemical plant is worthless without its automation systems. 
 
Modern automation systems are networked. Typically a process is controlled by 
a local control unit that may just transmit signals to and fro, but often also 
includes some logic capabilities. For example a programmable logic controller 
(PLC) may monitor and control the temperature or speed of a process. These 
units are then connected to a central control unit that monitors the overall 
process, called a distributed control system (DCS) or supervisory control and 
data acquisition (SCADA) system. These central controllers are usually 
connected to database servers and operator workstations using Ethernet and 
Internet technologies. [1] 
 
When automation technologies were developing, safety concerns were raised and 
while a hundred years ago an employee who lost important body parts to 
machines was considered careless, today’s automation is controlled both by laws 
and by a culture of safety and even minor incidents are a cause of inquiry. 
However, this culture of safety does not consider intentional harm. The situation 
is very analogous to computer security. Before the spread of Internet computer 
security was a theoretical field, with practical interest only to military and banks. 
When Internet became ubiquitous security became every person’s practical 
concern. Current automated systems are connected to the Internet, directly or 
indirectly, and the shift to security thinking has not yet happened in the 
profession. This is the very reason why the infrastructure of all developed nations 
is vulnerable. 
 
2.2 Targeting the critical infra 
 
Lewis [9] presents the critical infrastructure of a nation as 11 interdependent 
sectors, such as telecommunications, finance, postal service and chemical 
industries. His analysis points out that attacking any sector will likely affect 
several of other sectors. Transportation requires communications and fuel for 
daily operations, but also spare parts and food and water for drivers. Lewis 
categorizes the challenges of protecting this infrastructure to seven categories: 
size of national infrastructure, unclear command structure involving public and 
private sector, lack of information sharing, lack of knowledge on the complex 
infrastructure, interdependencies between the sectors, inadequate analysis tools 
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and the asymmetricity between a defender trying to defend everything and an 
attacker being able to pick any target. 
 
It should be noted that while Lewis stresses the interdependence of the critical 
infrastructure, actual governments often consider these sectors independent. For 
example the Finnish national security strategy charges Ministry of Traffic and 
communications with the responsibility for electric data and communications 
infrastructure, but Ministry of Employment and the Economy with providing the 
needed power. [2]  
 
For analyzing and solving the problem of protecting the infrastructure of a 
nation, Lewis recommends an approach that models properties of the 
infrastructure as a network. This enables the analysis of interdependencies and 
can bring out features of the infrastructure, such as critical links and nodes, 
cascade behavior (failures that spread causing other parts of the network to fail, 
too), or resiliency to failures. Once the network is understood, its parts can also 
be analyzed for threats and vulnerabilities. 
 
Lewis’s approach is particularly useful when analyzing a new area of national 
security. Governments have national security strategies, but for example the 
current Finnish strategy [2] is a static list of protection areas and tasks to be taken 
to protect them.  
 
 
3.  Actors 
 
Several groups of people may have an interest in damaging the infrastructure of a 
nation or performing other types of cyber attacks. [13] 
 
Nation states can see a possibility to reach their goals without resorting to 
military action. What is considered a war in cyberspace is not yet clear, nor is 
how to respond to acts of cyber war. The governmental actors may be from 
military or intelligence, or government controlled activists.  
 
Organized crime has found the networked society useful for criminal activities, 
such as extortion by threatening to perform denial of service attacks on web sites, 
simple blackmail by gaining access to information or encrypting data and 
demanding money for the decryption key. Cyber-physical systems provide an 
extension for these activities. 
 
Corporations might find that the anonymity of cyberspace lowers the risk of 
detection of disturbing the competition. Losses in production, defects in quality 
or disruption of logistics can make a difference to the competition. Corporations 
may also be aided by their national governments. The wellbeing and worth of a 
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nation is no longer as tied to the land area it controls, but to the wealth and 
profitability of its corporations and residents. 
 
Terrorists and politically motivated hactivists are likely to take advantage of 
the asymmetry provided by the digital environment. Their goal may be to 
damage the society or to get attention to their political message. 
 
Hobbyist hackers and script kiddies may damage the infrastructure just out of 
curiosity or neglect. 
 
Unhappy employees are traditionally known to be a sizeable threat segment in 
security. They have usually both knowledge of and access to systems and various 
motivations to cause them to use this knowledge for harmful activities.  
 
It should be noted that while protection from attacks from other nations and 
possibly terrorists falls under the military area, similar attacks from other parties 
are clearly a civilian law enforcement matter, even if there is no difference in act 
and damage.  
 
 
4.  Cyber Weapons 
 
When the Stuxnet worm came to light in 2010, it ignited the field of cyber 
security. Previous cyber attacks had been mostly politically motivated web site 
defacements or shutdowns, such as the Bronze soldier attacks against Estonia in 
2007 or the various attacks during the South Ossetian war in 2008. 
 
Stuxnet, however, was a different type of a beast. A carefully crafted software 
worm aimed at a single, specific target. At an assumed cost of millions of dollars, 
it was beyond the capabilities of hobbyist troublemakers, but extremely cheap by 
military standards. After Stuxnet the risk of a targeted, well resourced cyber 
attack can no longer be ignored. 
 
4.1 Protest attacks 
 
The Bronze Soldier attacks were targeted against Estonian web sites at 2007 and 
were related to moving a Soviet era statue in Tallinn. The effect of the attack was 
denial of service by traffic overload at web server and some servers were broken 
into and defaced. Similar attacks happened during the South Ossetian war in 
2008. 
These attacks had mostly nuisance value. When a web server is overloaded, it 
will return to normal use once the attack stops. Depending on network 
architecture, continuous attacks may be blocked by the network operator before 
they reach the target server. Defaced web sites are usually fairly easy to replace 
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from backups onto new server platforms that don’t have the vulnerabilities that 
let the attacker into the first server.  
 
Thus on the strategic level the attacks achieved nothing and on tactical level they 
tied up some resources and prevented use of web pages for a while. However, 
attacks of this type should not be considered insignificant. They are the 
equivalent of light cavalry or skirmishers, which do not have the power to win a 
battle, but can not be ignored either. Attacks of this type have a low cost, can 
hunt for targets of opportunity and tie up opponent’s resources. 
 
4.2 Advanced persistent threat 
 
Titan Rain is the US name for series of persistent, targeted attacks against US 
computer systems, especially in the defense industry 2003-2005. [12] The goal of 
these attacks appears to be to get access to sensitive information at specific 
targets. Attacks of this type have given rise to the concept of advanced persistent 
threat (APT), where the attacker sets a specific goal and keeps on trying to reach 
that goal, over a long period of time and using different methods. Unlike the 
nuisance attacks, ATP operations serve a strategic goal. 
 
4.3 Stuxnet 
 
Stuxnet is a carefully crafted worm targeted specifically against the Iranian 
Natanz nuclear enrichment plant [5]. It is designed to be transported inside the 
plant on a USB thumb drive where it will penetrate the controlling SCADA 
servers using known Windows vulnerabilities. After penetration the code will run 
on the server and program the controllers of the enrichment centrifuges to change 
their speed, which causes the high-speed centrifuges to break. To avoid detection 
the program reports false centrifuge speeds to the management system of the 
centrifuges, thus hiding the reason of centrifuge breaks. 
 
Stuxnet was created by United States and Israel [14] and it served two political 
goals: to slow down or stop the Iranian nuclear weapons program and to avoid 
using conventional military force in this. While the details of the Stuxnet 
program are not public, it has been estimated that the project might have been 
realized with only perhaps a dozen programmers and analysts and a budget in the 
order of millions of dollars [8]. Before the administration of United States 
decided to reveal their involvement, Stuxnet provided also plausible deniability, 
unlike a kinetic attack would have. 
 
The Stuxnet attack was a multiyear project preceded by careful reconnaissance of 
the target plant. Several versions of the worm were created and deployed. The 
attack followed the advanced persistent threat (APT) concept, where the attacker 
selects the target and keeps on working towards their goal, using high level of 
technology. 
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4.4 Other autonomous cyber weapons 
 
Besides Stuxnet, several other autonomous cyber weapons have been observed. 
We present Duqu and Flame, that are assumed to be linked to cyber operations 
by the United States.  
 
4.4.1 Duqu 
 
Duqu is a intelligence gathering Trojan horse that shares some components with 
the Stuxnet. Most likely it has been developed in same organization that has 
developed Stuxnet, too. [3, 4, 8]  
 
The general insertion method might vary, in one instance Duqu is known to have 
been inserted via e-mailed Word document. Duqu has several methods to make 
its detection harder: it may be recompiled differently for each insertion, after 
insertion Duqu waits for a 10 minute period of user inactivity before starting to 
install itself to the operating system, installation uses signed installation files 
making Duqu appear legitimate and after 30 days Duqu uninstalls itself unless 
instructed to remain. 
 
Duqu downloads the payload modules after installation. Observed functionalities 
include keylogging (keyboard capture), screen capture and transmitting selected 
files from the target host to the C&C server. Payloads can browse file shares and 
their download can be instructed from the C&C server, thus designating Duqu as 
an intelligence gathering platform is based on its use, not its capabilities. 
 
4.4.2 Flame 
 
Flame is a sophisticated modular attack toolkit, deployed to the Middle East in 
2010. Flame appears not to have any direct relation with Stuxnet, but it may be a 
separate approach by the same organization. The malware is large, about 20 MB 
in all, modular and communicates with its command and control servers. The 
payloads deployed have shown intelligence gathering features, capturing 
screenshots and keyboard input, recording audio and listening to network traffic. 
Flame has also its own SQL database for storing information and it uses a 
scripting language called LUA. [6, 16] 
 
Flame is an actively run piece of malware. Several versions have been found, 
which means that the code is being developed and updated. Various instances can 
have different modules deployed. Dozens of C&C servers are deployed around 
the world. Flame seems to collect AutoCAD drawings, e-mails, PDF-documents 
and sends them or summaries of them to the control servers. For spreading to 
new hosts, Flame uses several methods, one of which is masquerading as a 
Microsoft Windows Update server and sends itself to the target machine as a 
Windows Gadget update [7]. 
 84 
5.  From Cyber Weapons to Cyber-capability 
 
The previously presented examples show that existing cyber weapons are already 
modular and form a family of weapons that share some components and have 
other modules tailored for a particular task. We consider that a cyber weapon is 
just an instance created from a larger pool of cyber-capability. An individual tool 
has tactical and operational significance, a toolbox from which these tools are 
created has strategic significance. Based on what we know about existing cyber 
weapons and malware in general, we can describe a likely toolbox for future 
cyber operations. 
 
5.1 Independent component capabilities 
 
To be able to have a “cyber-capability”, the components must exist and be ready 
for use. The actual weapon is then integrated according to operational 
requirements. 
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Figure 1. Assembly and deployment of a cyber weapon 
 
5.1.1 Payloads 
 
Payload is the actual reason for the weapon, rest of the system serves it. Different 
types of payloads are needed for different missions.  
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Intelligence gathering payloads can look for files based on name or content, 
analyze the network to which the host machine is connected, use the microphone 
and web camera in the system, collect data from keyboard and display and so on. 
This intelligence can then be sent back to the controller of the operation using the 
command and control channels available. If network connectivity is not 
available, the data may be attached to the weapon itself and transported along 
with the weapon’s code as a virus. 
 
Misinformation payloads may be used for information warfare. These may take 
different forms but are likely to be targeted against specific systems, such as 
cyber-physical monitoring systems, centers for monitoring any vital resources or 
planning documents. Payloads of this type have a huge potential if they can 
control the information the leaders of the opposition see. Actual operations can 
be hidden, false ones created, logistics misdirected, equipment miscontrolled and 
so on. 
 
Destructive sabotage payloads may delete data from databases and files and 
format hard disks. They may also target cyber-physical systems. For the latter 
purpose the cyber-capability should include knowledge of potential target 
systems and how to control them. Part of building the cyber-capability may 
include collecting automation hardware from sources such as eBay for analysis.  
Nuisance payloads such as resource consuming denial of service (DoS) payloads 
may be used to attract attention and to consume both computing and human 
resources.  
 
To maintain operational security, the payload may be encrypted and the 
decryption key delivered later. 
 
5.1.2 Exploits 
 
A library of vulnerabilities in software and matching methods to use them 
(exploits) is needed to enter the target systems. According to current reports the 
price of a new, unpublished vulnerability (so called zero-day vulnerability) is in 
the order of hundreds of thousands of dollars for popular operating systems. 
Defense products companies, such as Vupen1 are already purchasing and selling 
these. [15] 
 
5.1.3 Mobility module 
 
If the system to be penetrated is protected by a firewall, air gap (no direct 
network connectivity) or some other method preventing direct access from the 
command and control servers, self-replicating, mobile code may be used, making 
the weapon in effect a worm or virus. The code must know what to copy and 
 
1 http://www.vupen.com 
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where in the new system, how to decide where to go, identify itself to avoid 
conflicting with itself. However, the viral mobility of the weapon makes it more 
likely to be detected and thus there is a case for leaving the mobility out, 
reducing the weapon to a Trojan horse. 
 
5.1.4 Command, control and communications module 
 
A cyber weapon may operate autonomously or have tight or loose control. An 
autonomous weapon must have its own logic programmed to control its payload 
activities and mobility, including the decision of whether to trigger the payload 
or not. Being able to control the weapon increases operator’s possibilities to react 
to findings, for example new modules may be loaded to the weapon. However, 
the control channel adds the risk of detection and may not be always technically 
possible. 
 
If the cyber weapon is deployed to a host that has network connectivity, it can 
communicate with the command and control (C&C) server (described in next 
section). The capabilities of this control channel depend on the properties of the 
path. Firewalls or intrusion prevention systems may limit the protocols or volume 
available. Hiding the existence and traffic on this channel is usually desirable. 
The channel may be masqueraded as a video game protocol or ordinary web 
browsing. Botnets consisting of a large amount of synchronized computers use 
often the Internet Relay Chat (IRC) as control channel, as it allows spreading 
information fast to large amounts of nodes. 
 
If direct network connectivity is not available, the weapon may use other 
methods, for example part of the weapon may be on an isolated network and 
connect using USB media to another part in an Internet connected network. Or 
the audio components of a computer may be used to communicate with another 
computer. 
 
A command and control channel is used to steer the cyber weapon and to receive 
data from it, and also to provide separation between the weapon and its users. A 
properly constructed command and control system includes sufficient number of 
cutouts to provide deniability to the owner of the weapon. 
 
5.1.5 Command and control servers 
 
Cyber attacks may be controlled from the attacker’s own computers (leading to 
easy detection) or, more preferably, from deniable computers, either captured 
third party computers or legally acquired hosts. 
 
A suitable controller would be a server host from a cloud server, easily acquired 
at low cost. Any competent intelligence organization should be able to organize a 
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process for acquiring a set of untraceable servers spread internationally to 
different places. 
 
The weapon code must carry some address that enables it to locate the control 
server. This could be the IP address or DNS name of the server or some more 
complicated method, like IRC channel name, Bittorrent hash table or a WWW 
URL. This will be found when the weapon is found and dissected, thus the need 
for a deniable server and additional cut-outs even when connecting to that server 
(e.g. making all connections over public WLAN). 
 
5.1.6 Droppers 
 
To deliver the viral software to the target system, a dropper component can be 
used. The dropper enables packaging the rest of the software to an e-mail 
message, web page, software update, auto-executable file on a USB drive or 
other initial delivery vector. When activated, the dropper installs the viral code to 
the target system, where it activates and starts its own activities. (Applies also to 
Trojan horses, explain terminology somewhere.) 
 
The actual code for the software can be included in the same package as the 
dropper, or it can be downloaded from elsewhere. As seen in the case of Duqu 
the dropper can contain its own stealth methods, such as waiting for a period of 
no keyboard activity to initiate its operations.  
 
To give an example, one of the methods used to inject the commercial FinFisher2 
surveillance product to the target workstation is to send an e-mail message with 
the program included. To avoid the recipient to notice that the attachment is a 
program, it is named gjp.1bajaR.exe, with the Unicode “right-to-left override” 
character as first character, causing the file name to appear as 
exe.Rajab1.jpg. [10] 
 
5.2 Integrated components and capabilities 
 
In addition to the prepared modules, there are features useful for a cyber weapon, 
that do not form their own software module. 
 
5.2.1 Stealth 
 
In general low probability of detection is a desirable feature in cyber weapons. 
This is not a property of any individual component, but a property that emerges 
from overall design and operation of the weapon. Detection can be avoided by 
features such as slow propagation rate, small size, ability to hide in the operating 
system and low activity level when human are operators present. A common way 
 
2 http://www.finfisher.com 
 88 
 
for intruders and malware to hide in the operating system is to masquerade as 
utility programs, device drivers, software libraries and such, and to modify or 
replace analysis tools with versions that do not show the processes and files of 
the malware or the intruder. Stealth during the installation may be assisted by 
acquiring valid installation certificates for the cyber weapon. 
 
5.2.2 Hidden components 
 
To avoid analysis parts of the malware can be encrypted without including the 
decryption key in the malware itself. The key to activate the encrypted portion 
may be transmitted from operations center or may be created (via a cryptographic 
hash) from environmental parameters the weapon will encounter only when it 
reaches the target system.  
 
5.2.3 Removal of tracks 
 
To avoid detection and analysis a cyber weapon may want to remove its tracks in 
various ways. A sensible guideline would be to remove any component, like the 
dropper, when it is no longer needed. If possible, the weapon should analyze the 
backup service in the target system and to try to avoid being included in the 
backup. 
 
5.2.4 Kill switch 
 
For various reasons it may be desirable that the operation of a cyber weapon to 
be halted. For weapons that are able to connect to the Internet, this may be a 
message from the control server. To protect the weapon, this message may be 
cryptographically signed to verify its authenticity (using asymmetric encryption 
means that detection of the decryption key does not matter). One method to kill 
the weapon would be to prepare an identification string and removal instructions 
for anti-viral software, to be published if needed. 
 
5.2.5 Countermeasures after detection 
 
To avoid analysis and to gain time future cyber weapons may include 
functionality to defend itself from detection. There is no trivial way to identify 
detection, but access to the weapon’s files or processes may indicate an attempt 
to detect it, as does use of system tools. If the weapon estimates that it has been 
detected or detection is likely, it can activate countermeasures such as spreading 
rapidly virally, mutate itself to avoid analysis or even spawn a hidden copy of 
itself or a different weapon. The goal is not so much to avoid detection, but to 
gain time by increasing the defender’s work load. Human detection and analysis 
move at human speed, while software moves at subsecond time frame. 
Depending on the mission, the weapon might gain mission success even after 
initial detection, by avoiding analysis and keeping the defenders occupied. 
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5.3 Operational integration 
 
As discussed above, a modular architecture is a likely solution to be employed 
for creating a cyber weapons capability in the long run. Modularity allows the 
actual weapons to be crafted according to the needs, increasing flexibility and 
decreasing costs. However, modularity is not without its own issues. 
For a modular system to work, the interfaces between the components and the 
architecture need to be well defined. Ideally it should be possible to create a 
weapon just by selecting its desired functionality and assembling the 
components, in practice this might be challenging if cloaking from anti-viral 
detectors is also desired. Depending on the architecture, there may be a need for 
integration testing. 
 
Thorough testing takes time that may not be available. It can be assumed that any 
cyber weapon will have defects and some of these defects will cause unintended 
consequences. For example an autonomous cyber weapon may start to spread 
more rapidly and widely than intended or it may target wrong systems, including 
the operator’s own systems. 
 
To make detection harder, a compiler can be created that randomizes the 
structure of code thus making each instance of the weapon unique and more 
difficult to be recognized by antiviral software and other tools. There could be 
several libraries that are randomly used to implement same higher layer 
primitives or different machine language operands can be used for same low 
level function. In a similar way dropper programs may be created in a way, that 
makes them appear unique. Each target system could then be targeted with an 
individual binary. 
 
 
6.  Cyber Doctrine 
 
From the study of existing cyber weapons, we propose some insight that could be 
included when creating a cyber doctrine.  
 
6.1 Defensive cyber strategy for the nation and its military 
 
The military forces of a nation exist only to protect it, thus the cyber strategy 
must protect the nation, not just its military forces. As shown, the digital civilian 
infrastructure presents a great vulnerability to modern society and requires 
protection. However, the national defense strategy does not necessarily require 
this part of defense to be under the military. This cyber defense may be 
considered part of civil defense, instead of military defense, thus also being more 
likely to be considered unlawful target for military actions. [17] 
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Credibility of cyber defense is not based on the amount of servers, firewalls or 
technicians, as the attacker can select the point of attack. We think that the most 
effective way of providing credible cyber defense is to show that a nation has a 
comprehensive cyber security program that covers all areas of critical 
infrastructure. Such a program would include recognizing and analyzing the 
critical infrastructure, educating its operators, setting standards and requirements 
and auditing the results. A nation thusly protected is likely to survive a cyber 
attack and less likely to be attacked in the first place. If the program is in civilian 
hands, it enables the claim that their infrastructure is not a lawful target. 
 
6.2 Offensive cyber strategy 
 
Offensive strategy is not as necessary as defense. Retaliation against cyber 
attacks with similar attacks is not a sound strategy, as the source of attacks is 
likely to be very hard to identify. 
 
The basis of an offensive strategy is a constant creation of cyber-capabilities and 
targets. Computer and cyber-physical systems can change rather rapidly and the 
time it takes to develop a weapon from scratch may close the time window to hit 
that target.  
 
However, since the industrial automation sector is very conservative in deploying 
updates to operating systems and other software, in fear of disturbing the process 
being controlled, there is a permanent window of opportunity between release of 
a security update and its deployment. During this window the supplier of the 
automation system and its users are verifying that the new patch does not disturb 
the control systems and the attacker may reverse engineer the update and develop 
an exploit to be used before the update is deployed. 
 
Targeting is likely to require creation of intelligence gathering operations to 
support he cyber operations. If the target is civilian infrastructure, information 
can often be easily obtained from public sources, such as tenders for automation 
systems or company websites.  
 
A long term strategic process can be described: Learn the capabilities of cyber 
weapons. Create a cyber-command leadership that understands these capabilities. 
Communicate these capabilities to other branches in the military and intelligence 
community. Make sure enough knowledge is available to the planning of military 
operations. Knowledge of cyber-capabilities should be available to planners so 
that cyber operations can be used to support or replace conventional operations. 
 
6.3 Cyber deterrence 
 
The concept of deterrence is based on the ability to inflict retaliatory force on an 
adversary at will and using this ability to force the opponent to refrain from some 
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actions. For example nuclear deterrent is based on the capability of being able 
detect development of nuclear weapons and to deliver unilateral destruction that 
the target can not prevent. 
 
Credible defense deflects the deterrence. Resource consuming denial of service 
attacks can be thwarted by deploying more resources. Logical attacks, in turn, 
can be thwarted by removing systems off-line, maintaining proper security 
practices and distributing systems so that exploiting the remaining vulnerabilities 
does not ensure catastrophic failure of systems. Thus using cyber weapons to 
threat other parties is likely to not be very effective. (For opposing viewpoint see 
Mazanec [12].) 
 
Existence of conventional military capabilities can often be detected, as such 
devices take physical space and large projects to create. Cyber-capabilities can be 
developed by a team of tens and the knowledge be kept to hundreds of people 
and their existence hidden inside any large bureaucracy with ease. This means 
that non-proliferation of cyber weapons is in practice hard or impossible to 
monitor and verify, unlike with conventional weapons, such as inter-continental 
missiles. 
 
6.4 Defensive cyber operations 
 
Due to the asymmetry of cyber conflict, the situation is analogous of defense of a 
medieval castle, where the defender must protect the perimeter everywhere and 
the attacker may decide where to focus force. In cyber defense, there are 
additional challenges. The defender is likely to not notice the attack in the first 
place, especially if it is logical by nature. The defender can not deflect the attack 
easily by moving resources inside the perimeter, as only a limited amount of 
people can work on one system. Each attack that penetrates the perimeter 
requires sanitizing its target computing environment while preventing the attack 
to reoccur. This process may require shutting down services or whole cyber-
physical production systems and may take weeks or months. 
 
Our recommendation for the defensive cyber doctrine is to identify critical 
systems and nodes in the cyber systems of the defender. Lewis [9] provides a 
model based on network analysis for this. As the cyber attack may preclude a 
conventional attack, it is not enough to protect just operational military systems, 
but the analysis should cover military support systems and the critical 
infrastructure of the nation. The defender must take into account the effects that a 
large scale disarray in civilian infrastructure will have to the ability of the 
military to operate.  
 
A wealth of literature exists on computer and network security. New cyber 
attacks do not change the practices described in the literature, but give rise to 
some adjustments. The attacker may have the resources of a nation state in use. 
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Following the APT model means that the attacker may spend a lot of resources 
using various means on a specific target. The realization that the target may not 
be Web servers, but the entire digital infrastructure of a society, networked or 
not, enlargers the target area. Together all of these mean that a nation has a large 
domain to protect and at the current time much of the cyber-physical systems are 
without protection. 
 
There is no current clear vision on when to consider that cyber attacks form a 
cyber war. This might potentially depend on if the attacks can be recognized in 
the first place, or even confirmed as actual intentional attacks, the identity of the 
attackers, if identified, the scale of operations, the chosen targets and possibly 
several other parameters. The difference between an attack and a war is a 
significant issue as the rules of engagement and control of the defense might shift 
from the law enforcement or other civilian entities to the military forces. A 
proper cyber doctrine should define these issues in a manner that does not disturb 
the defense by changing the command structure in the middle of operations. 
 
We think at this point that a sensible doctrine would charge the owners of digital 
infrastructure with their protection and have a civilian agency in charge of 
controlling the protection, even in time of war. The military would then be in 
charge of protecting its own infrastructure and possible offensive operations. 
 
6.5 Offensive cyber operations 
 
Continuously collecting vulnerabilities and exploits and building the platforms to 
use them is necessary in preparation for offensive operations. Also building a 
network of deniable hosts on the Internet is necessary to maintain secrecy of the 
operator. As these are low cost operations, it can be claimed that these 
preparations should be made even if the strategic doctrine does not include use of 
offensive capabilities.  
 
The modules should be built by different teams using different styles and tools, 
and the deployment of integrated modules should be recorded, to avoid 
traceability from re-use of components. It should be assumed that any deployed 
weapon will be found and reverse-engineered and analyzed. 
 
One of the challenges of offensive cyber operations is evaluating their 
effectiveness. Martino [11] recommends forming a baseline prior to the attack 
and evaluating the changes caused by the attack. Martino also recommends using 
network analysis to identify the effect of an attack at connected nodes. 
 
Time behaves differently in cyber operations than in conventional operations. 
Operations like Suxnet may be run over several years, while a prepared, targeted 
operation may be executed in seconds. We evaluate that the following time scales 
should be applied to cyber operations: 
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– Creating modules: months to years 
– Running operations: days to years 
– Defensive operations: minutes to days 
– Detection of an attack: seconds to years 
– Analysis after weapon capture: days to months 
 
6.6 Defensive cyber tactics 
 
The practicalities of defending cyber systems can be found in common data 
security practices that should be extended to cyber-physical systems, too. To 
thwart attacks it is useful to be able to detect them, however this might be 
impossible if the attack is well planned. We have not yet seen use of multiple 
simultaneous coordinated attacks in cyber war, in such a case tactical leadership 
and maintaining situational awareness becomes very important. The author’s 
experience from security incidents is that specialists tend to become very focused 
on handling particular incidents and the larger picture is easily lost, leaving 
systems unmonitored. The cyber doctrine should include a model for handling 
cyber incidents and in case of a cyber war it is likely that these incidents will 
have an intensity that greatly exceeds conventional data security incidents. 
 
6.7 Offensive cyber tactics 
 
As discussed earlier, cyber weapons may have intelligence, misinformation, 
destructive or nuisance capabilities. These weapons may be used alone or in 
combination with other weapons, but also in combined arms operations to 
support conventional military forces. Cyber attacks prior to a conventional attack 
may disturb logistics and other support services, weakening the defender. 
 
During the conventional attack coordinated cyber attacks may be used to distract 
the defender, give wrong information on the target of the attack and to gain 
information on the defender, even possibly by monitoring defender’s actions via 
CCTV cameras. 
 
We propose that conventional leaders should view their cyber-capability as light 
cavalry. A force for reconnaissance, distracting the enemy, probing attacks and 
operations behind the lines.  
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
We have presented a modular architecture for cyber weapons and argue that 
strategic offensive cyber-capability is the ability to construct various weapons 
from prepared modules within a reasonable time frame. For defense against these 
weapons we point to traditional data security practices and network analysis to 
identify the critical points in the digital infrastructure. We also have shown how 
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cyber operations can be used to support conventional military operations, or to 
replace them, depending on the intended goal. 
 
However, we feel that our study creates more questions than answers. Should 
cyber defense be in the hands of the military or civilians?  What are lawful 
targets for cyber operations and are cyber defenders combatants or civilians?  
While it seems impossible to prevent the development of cyber weapons, what 
are proper ways to retaliate against their development or use?  
 
The study of cyber warfare is still in its infancy. When the needs and wishes of 
nations clash, cyberspace may grow to be as important a dimension as the air 
became, a century ago. 
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